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My thesis is on tax avoidance provisions in South Africa. I want to present an overview of tax 
avoidance in South Africa but I will concentrate more on section 103(1) which is the general anti 
- tax avoidance provision in South Africa.I will then proceed to look at the artificial tax 
avoidance, and a comparative analysis between United Kingdom (UK) and South Africa on the 
substance over form approach as a new approach to tax avoidance. Much has been said on tax 
avoidance and it is an area which has generated much interest and curiosity to the society at 
large. 
While the main reason for concern about large scale tax avoidance and evasion is their effect on 
\ 
the equity of the tax system, they also result in a waste of economic resources. The amount that 
the revenue loses because of tax dodgers cannot be determined with precision. A progressive tax, 
designed to reduce inequality of incomes, inevitably means marginal rates which are both high in 
themselves and markedly higher than average tax rates. This is then an inducement to evade or 
avoid taxes. 
CHAPTER2 
2.1 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TAX AVOIDANCE AND TAX EVASION 
Efforts within the existing law to minimise tax payments are described as tax avoidance; efforts 
outside the law to minimise tax payments are described as tax evasion. Thus legal avoidance of 
tax must not be confused with tax evasion. Tax evasion refers to illegal actions taken to reduce 
the tax burden, such as falsifying of records, not declaring all your income, or claiming false 
deductions. 
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These actions are illegal and punishable as a crime. The sums avoided legally by rich people's 
arrangement and disposition of their resources are, in per capita terms, doubtless quite 
considerable. 
There is a general agreement that tax avoidance and evasion are similar economically but 
dissimilar morally and politically : tax avoidance is legal and tax evasion is criminal act. There is 
thus a thin line between tax avoidance and tax evasion and it is the economic similarity that 
constitutes a principal justification for the coinage "tax avoision". The difficulty experienced in 
maintaining the distinction between the. lawful nature of tax avoidance and the illegality 
concerning tax evasion is evident from the ex - Minister of Finance, Mr Du Plessis' speech that: 
" It is regrettably true that there are those who consciously and wilfully evade taxation 
and those who cynically manipulate tax avoidance to such an extent that it cannot be 
construed as anything but evasion of taxation."' 
The nature and extent of tax avoidance practices has caused a range of legislation introducing 
various anti tax avoidance measures in the Income Tax Act2 designed to curb such practices. 
South Africa employs a combination of general and specific legislation aimed at a particular type 
of transaction or scheme. Thus apart from the general anti - tax avoidance section 103( 1 ), there 
are specific measures which include the following : 
1) SECTION 7 
which is aimed at preventing the taxpayer from reducing his liability for income tax through 
artificial arrangements which divert income to minor child. If a taxpayer gives up a right to 
income and to any control over the income or source of the income, even with the avowed 
purpose ofreducing his tax liability, he should not be taxed on that income. 
1 1985 Taxpayer@53 
2 58 of 1962 
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However if he contrives matters in such a way that he continues to enjoy the benefits of the 
income. or if he continues to control the source or disposition of income, he should not be 
allowed to reduce his liability below what a taxpayer in similar circumstances receiving the 
income would normally be expected to pay in which case section 7 deems accrual or receipt in 
such circumstances. 
SECTIONS 7(3) AND (4) 
deems any income which accrues to a minor child as a result of a disposition, donation or 
settlement by a parent to be income of a parent. 
SECTIONS 7(5), (6) AND (7) 
hit at tax avoidance through the medium of donation, settlement or disposition which are wholly 
or partly gratuitous by deeming the income accruing to or accumulated on behalf of the donee to 
be that of the donor. 
2) SECTIONS 8B, C AND D 
are aimed at dividend stripping operations. 
3) SECTION SE 
which aims at preventing the lending of money in return for non - taxable dividends instead of 
interest, which is fully taxable, deems certain types of dividend income to be interest and 
therefore taxable in full. 
4) SECTION 8(5) 
which prevents the use of previously deducted rentals by lessee as part of the purchase price for 
the property. 
5) SECTIONS 9 AND 9A 
deem certain income received from foreign sources, to be from sources within the Republic, are 
aimed at tax avoidance schemes which take advantage of the principle of source, since South 
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Africa levies income tax on a source basis, to ensure that income is not taxable in the Republic. 
6) SECTION 9C 
Inorder to ensure that foreign sourced investment income is taxed in South Africa, section 9C has 
been introduced into the Income Tax Act to deem such income to be of o South African source. 
Investment income as defined in section 9C includes annuity, interest, rental, royalty or other 
similar income. It however excludes pensions as a result of pat employment, or payments under 
social security systems of other countries. This taxation of passive income accords with the 
Recommendations of the Katz Commission of Inquiry into tax avoidance structure in South 
Africa considering the implications of away from the source basis of taxation to residence or 
world-wide basis, as contained in its Fifth Interim Report. 
7) SECTION 9D 
Inorder to circumvent the provision of section 9C it may be the intention of certain residents to 
cause a company to formed in a foreign jurisdiction for the purposes of earning investment 
income . This foreign registered company will then pay dividends to the South African resident. 
Dividends are currently tax exempt in terms of section lO(l)(k) and the end result would be that 
the South African resident would be able to earn investment income free of tax, if the overseas 
company were to be set up in an overseas tax haven. Section 9D which has been introduced to 
counter this type of tax avoidance, taxes the South African resident on his proportionate share of 
the foreign company's investment income. 
9) SECTION 23A 
was introduced to counter "leverage" leasing schemes. 
10) SECTION 23D 
prevents deduction of excessive allowances claimed on assets acquired from connected persons 
or lessees who in turn claimed allowances on these same assets. 
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11) SECTION 24H 
which ,is aimed at preventing the use of limited partnerships and the " limited partners" in an en 
commandite to the amounts for which they are" at risk". It therefore limits deductions that may 
be claimed by the limited partners to the amounts for which they are "at risk". 
12) SECTION 31 
which hits at transfer pricing. 
13) SECTION 103(2) 
aimed at remedying the mischief of trafficking in assessed loss. 
14) SECTION 103(5) 
aimed at certain schemes in which the taxpayer cedes his right to interest income in exchange for 
receiving dividend income which is tax exempt in terms of section 10(1 )(k). 
2.2 JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TO TAX AVOIDANCE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS. 
Judicial role in tax avoidance cases was stated as follows: 
" The role of the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief 
and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for the 
continuance of the mischief and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure 
and remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the Act pro bono publico." 3 
In Cir v Kin~ Watermeyer _ CJ postulated a number of stratagems which a person might 
legitimately adopt with the intention of avoiding or reducing tax. For instance, he stated that a 
person might abstain from earning income by closing down his business, or by resigning his job; 
he might sell income producing investments and not re - invest the proceeds orelse buy a non -
3 
September Taxpayer 1976 @ 172 
4 1947(2) SA 196 A 
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income producing capital asset; he might sell shares which produce high dividends and re -
invest in securities which earned a lower but safer return; a professional man might reduce his 
fees, or work for nothing. 
It is a right of every taxpayer to arrange his affairs in such a way that he pays the minimum 
amount of tax that is required of him. The right of every taxpayer to avoid or reduce his tax 
liability was stated in the leading case in the United Kingdom (UK) on the issue of tax avoidance 
as follows: 
"Every taxpayer is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the 
appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be. Ifhe succeeds in so ordering them so as 
to secure this result, then, however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue 
or his fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an 
increased tax. "5 
The legitimacy of tax avoidance in the UK was adopted by English courts in Ayshire Pullman 
Motor Services v CIR §:_by Lord Clyde stating as follows: 
"No man in this country is under the smallest obligation, moral or other, so as to arrange 
his legal relations to his business or to his property as to enable the Inland Revenue to put 
the largest possible shovel in his stores. The Inland Revenue is not slow - and quite rightly 
to take every advantage which is open to it under the taxing statutes for the purpose of 
depleting the taxpayer's pocket. And the taxpayer is in the like manner, entitled to be astute 
to prevent, so far as he honestly can, the depletion of his means by the Revenue." 
The same principle is recognized in the United States as per Learned Hand J who expressed 
similar sentiments in Helverine V Greeorr : 
" Every taxpayer is entitled to arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; 
he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the treasury." 
5 Lord Tomlin in Duke Of Westminster v IRC, 51 TLR 467,19 TC 490 @520 
6 (1928) 14 TC 754@ 763 - 4 
7 (1934) 69 F(2d) 809 (2nd Cir.) @810 
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And in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v Newmanit the court stated as follows: 
"Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging one's 
affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do 
right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands : taxes are 
enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more in the name of morals is 
mere cant." 
This is not to say that the courts have not expressed disapproval of the practice of tax avoidance, 
for instance Lord Denning in Re Weston's Settlements2 stated that: 
"The avoidance of tax may be lawful, but it is not yet a virtue." 
Also, in the case of Latilla v Inland Revenue Commissioners10 , Viscount Simon stated that : 
"My lords, of recent years much ingenuity has been expended in certain quarters in 
attempting to devise methods of disposition of income by which those who were prepared 
to adopt them might enjoy the benefits of residence in this country while receiving the 
equivalent of such income without sharing in the appropriate burden of British taxation. 
Judicial dicta may be cited which point out that, however elaborate and artificial such 
methods may be, those who adopt them are "entitled" to do so. There is of course, no doubt 
that they are within their legal rights, but that is no reason why their efforts, or those of 
professional gentlemen who assist them in the matter, should be regarded as a 
commendable exercise of ingenuity or as a discharge of duties of good citizenship. 
On the contrary, one result of such methods, if they succeed, is, of course, to increase pro tanto 
the load of tax on the shoulders of the great body of good citizens who do not desire, or do not 
know how, to adopt these manoeuvres." 
This is clear evidence of the evil inherent in tax avoidance as only those who have skills, money 
8 (1947) 159 F(2d) 848,@ 850 - 1 
9 [1968] 3 ALL ER 338 (CA) @ 342 
10 1943 AC 377@ 380 - 1 
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and have legal and business connections on how to pay the least tax possible will fare well such 
that the end result is that the rich become richer and the poor get poorer. The effect of those 
astute taxpayers who seek to avoid tax is to cast an additional burden upon those " honest 
citizens" who lack the know - how and financial means to embark on tax avoidance schemes. 
Disapproval of such a practice was expressed by Lord Normand in the case of Vestey's (Lord) 
Executors and another v Inland Revenue Commissioners11 as follows : 
"Parliament in its attempt to keep pace with the ingenuity devoted to tax avoidance may 
fall short of this purpose. That is the misfortune for the taxpayers who do not try to avoid 
their fair share of the burden, and it is disappointing to the Inland Revenue. 
But the court will not stretch the terms of taxing Acts inorder to improve on the efforts of 
parliament and to stop gaps which are left open by the statutes. Tax avoidance is an evil, 
but it would be the beginning of much greater evils if the Courts were to overstretch the 
language of the statute inorder to subject to taxation people of whom they disapprove." 
After citing the above passage in Cot v Ferera12_ MacDonald proceeded as follows: 
"I endorse the opinion expressed that the avoidance of tax is an evil. Not only does it mean 
that a taxpayer escapes the obligation of making his proper contribution to the fiscus, but 
the effect must necessarily be to cast an additional burden on taxpayers who, imbued with a 
greater sense of civic responsibility, make no attempt to escape or, lacking the financial 
means to obtain the advice and set up the necessary tax avoidance machinery, fail to do so. 
Moreover, the nefarious practice of tax avoidance aims opponents of our capitalist society 
with potent arguments that it is only the rich, the astute and the ingenious who prosper in it 
and that "good citizens" will always fare badly." 
A better approach is to recognise the taxpayers right to so arrange his affairs that he ends up 
paying the minimum amount of tax that is legally expected and required of him. Then the next 
issue must be whether the taxpayer has succeeded in so arranging his affairs in such a way that 
11 (1949) 1 ALL ER 1108@ 1120 
12 1976(2) SA 653 (RAD), 38 SATC 66 @70 
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his conduct does not fall within the confines of the Income Tax Act as per section 103(1). This 
approach is correctly laid down in the practice note number 6 issued~by the Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue on 1 April 1987 in connection with section 105A of the Income Tax Act: 
"A taxpayer who has carried out a legitimate tax avoidance scheme i.e who has arranged 
his affairs so as to minimise his tax liability, in a manner which does not involve fraud, 
dishonesty, misrepresentation or other actions designed to mislead the Commissioner, will 
have met his duties and obligations under the Act if he fully and honestly completes his 
income tax return and honestly answers any queries raised by the Commissioner." 
The mischief against which the legislature seeks to curb by the anti - tax avoidance provisions 
was thus summed up more eloquently in the English case of Furniss v Dawson13 , by Lord 
Templeman stating that: 
"While tax avoidance is not, by definition, an illegal activity, a tax avoidance 
industry of the scale which developed in the 1970's had to be destroyed. The 
origins of the new approach by the courts had to be seen as a reaction to the 
growth and activities of this industry. An industry of that nature and that size had 
the capacity to make considerable inroads into government revenues and 
essentially created two nations of taxpayers; those "in the know" with the 
financial resources enabling them to use the artificial devices to avoid tax 
altogether, and those to whom, through lack of knowledge or resources, such 
opportunities were not open." 
CHAPTER4 
THE GENERAL ANTI - TAX AVOIDANCE PROVISION: SECTION 103(1) 
The anti - tax avoidance provision of the notorious section 103(1) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 
1962 which seeks to remedy the mischief of tax avoidance in South Africa empowers the 
commissioner to determine the liability for any tax, duty or levy imposed by the Income Tax Act 
13 
1984 AC 474 
12 
and the amount of that tax, duty or levy: 
- as if the transaction, operation or scheme in question has not been entered into or 
carried out; or 
- in such a manner as in the circumstances of the case he deems appropriate for the 
prevention, postponement or reduction of liability for the tax I in question. 
PRE - 1996 AMENDMENT 
Before the commissioner could exercise his powers he had to be satisfied that -
(1) A transaction, operation or scheme, including one involving the alienation of property, was 
entered into or carried out ( whether before or after the commencement of the Act); 
(2) which has the effect of avoiding, postponing or reducing liability for any tax imposed by the 
Act; and 
(3) having regard to the circumstances in which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered 
into or carried out, it 
- was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not ormally be 
employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, peration or scheme of the 
nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question, or 
- has created rights or obligations which would not, normally be created between persons 
dealing at arms length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the 
transaction, operation or scheme in question; 
(4) was entered into or carried out solely or mainly for the purposes of the avoidance or the 
postponement of liability for the payment of any tax, duty or levy ( whether imposed by 
this Act or any previous Income Tax or any other law administered by the Commissioner) 
or the reduction of the amount of such liability. 
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All the above mentioned elements must co-exist before the commissioner can successfully 
invoke the anti - tax avoidance provisions of section 103, who cannot do so if any one or more 
of these elements is not present. 14 
The taxes referred to are : 
(a) those imposed by the Act viz. normal tax, donations tax and non - resident 
shareholders'tax; and 
(b)those imposed under any other law administered by the commissioner, viz. 
(i) estate duty under the Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955; 
(ii) marketable securities tax under the Marketable Securities Tax Act 32 f 1948; 
(iii) stamp duty under the Stamp Duty Act 77 of 1968; 
(v) transfer duty under the Transfer Duty Act 40 of 1949 
(v) value added tax under the Value Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 
SIGNIFICANT AMENDMENTS TO ANTI - TAX AVOIDANCE PROVISION SECTION 
103(1} 
Fundamental amendments have been made to improve the efficacy of section 103(1) 
(a) the scheme, transaction or operation must have been carried out or entered into solely or 
mainly for the purposes of obtaining a tax benefit. 
A 'tax benefit' as per by section 103(7) is defined as including ' any avoidance, postponement or 
reduction of liability for payment of any tax, duty or levy imposed by [the] Act or by any other 
law administered by the Commissioner." A definition of a tax benefit as contained in section 
73(2) of the Value Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 is instructive in this regard, which is defined as 
including: 
- any reduction in the liability of a person to pay tax; 
14 
SIR v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert 1971(3) SA 567 A, 33 SATC 113 
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- any increase in the entitlement of a vendor to a refund; 
- any reduction in the consideration payable by the person in respect of any supply; or 
- any other avoidance or postponement of liability for the payment of any tax, duty,levy 
imposed by the Act or any other law administered by the commissioner. 
(b) If the scheme is "in the context of business", it must, in the light of the circumstances in 
which it was entered into or carried out "in a manner which would not normally be employed for 
bona fide business purposes, other than the obtaining of a tax benefit." 
(c) In the case of any other schemes which are not "in the context of business", it must in the 
light of circumstances in which it was entered into or carried out, must have been entered into or 
carried out " by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering 
into or carrying out of a scheme, transaction or operation of the nature of the transaction, 
operation or scheme in question." 
(d) Alternatively, in either above events, it must in the light of the circumstances in which it was 
entered into or carried out, have created rights or obligations which would not normally be 
created between persons dealing at arms length under a transaction, operation or scheme in 
question. 
(e) Where the provisions of section 103 are successfully applied, commissioner's discretionary 
powers granted in terms of section 89 quat(3) and 3A in terms of which he may direct that 
interest shall not be paid have been circumscribed in terms of section 103(6). Section 103(6) has 
the effect that where the provisions of section 103 are successfully applied, interest will be 
payable in respect of so much of the tax as is attributable to the application of section 103 
4.1 A TRANSACTION, OPERATION OR SCHEME 
The first requirement which must be complied with inorder to enable the commissioner to invoke 
section 103(1) is that there must be a transaction, operation or scheme. These are not defined in 
\ 
the Act and we thus rely on judicial interpretation of these terms. Section 73(2) of the Value 
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Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 which defines the 'scheme' is instructive. A 'scheme' is defined as" 
any transaction, operation or scheme or understanding whether or not enforceable, including all 
steps and transactions by which it carried into effect."· The phrase 'transaction, operation or 
scheme' is not exhaustive and has been further extended by the addition of the words 'involving 
the alienation of property'. 
The courts have held that a series of transactions constituted a scheme, even though not all the 
steps were contemplated at the outset i.e the taxpayer need not have a tax avoidance purpose 
when the early steps of what will ultimately constitute a scheme are taken as in Meyeworitz v 
CIR15 where in regard to the question whether the appellant's arrangements constituted a 
'transaction, operation or scheme', it was argued on behalf of the appellant, that the various steps 
taken by him did not constitute a pre - conceived plan 
and so did not have the essential continuity or inter - relationship to make up one of the types of 
arrangements referred to in the Act. 
The Special Court held that, in regard to the legal textbooks, the creation of the "Visandra 
investments (Pty) Ltd", the transfer to it of the rights to the textbooks and subsequent transfer of 
these rights to the trust, constituted a scheme. The Appellate Division was satisfied that from 
beginning to end the steps taken in each of the two arrangements, including the formation of 
"The Taxpayer (Pty) Ltd", constituted schemes within the meaning of the section. It held that the 
argument that when "The Taxpayer (Pty) Ltd" was formed there was no intention to embark 
upon the series of steps eventually taken, did not hold water. 
In this regard a passage from an English case of Crossland anspector of Taxes} v Hawkins16 
was cited with approval where the court stated as follows : 
"It was not necessary inorder to constitute an "arrangement" within section 397 of the 
Income Tax Act of 1952 that the eventual arrangement must be in contemplation from the 
very outset. Confining oneself for moment to the facts of this case and remembering that 
income tax is an annual tax, one finds the whole "arrangement" conceived, and in being in 
15 1963(3) SA 863 A 
16 [1961] 2 ALL ER 812 (CA)@817 
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the one income tax year, 1954 - 1955. The company is formed, the service agreement 
executed and the deed of settlement made, all this in one year. Even were it otherwise, 
there is sufficient unity about the whole matter to justify its being called an arrangement for 
this purpose, because the ultimate object is to secure for somebody money free from what 
would otherwise be the burden or the full burden of surtax." 
Merely because the final step to secure this objective is left unresolved at the outset, and 
decided on later, does not rob the scheme of the sufficient unity to justify its being 
called an "arrangement". 
The principle laid down in Meyeworitz case ,therefore, is that the fundamental factor in 
determining whether a series of steps can constitute a transaction, operation or scheme is 
whether, looking in retrospect the steps taken, they are sufficiently inter - related to lead 
ultimately to the avoidance of tax. This involves an objective assessment of the facts but at the 
same time the subjective element cannot be disregarded entirely because in section 103(1)(c) the 
purpose with which a transaction was entered into is an essential ingredient of the arrangement. 
The fact that the intention to avoid the payment of tax appears only from later steps is of no 
relevant consequence as evident in Meyeworitz case17 where Beyers JA summed up the position 
as follows: 
"In my opinion the commissioner was entitled to ignore completely "The Taxpayer (Pty) 
Ltd" .It is true that the Special Court found that when it was formed there was no 
purpose of tax avoidance. But although it may have come upon the scene with good 
intentions, it ceased almost at one to be an innocent bystander. It became a party to the 
scheme when it ceded its only asset to the partnership : it was essential to the scheme that it 
should do so." 
4.1.1 INVOLVING THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY 
17 
supra at page 875 
17 
One way to avoid income tax is to give away income producing property, in other words 
alienation of corpus. 
In Cir v Kin~ this position was stated by Watemeyer CJ as follows : 
"A taxpayer can, while retaining the ownership of his capital, arrange for the fruits of that 
capital which are in reality part of his income, to be received by someone else, and thus he 
can free himself from taxation in respect of these moneys." 
We must however be aware of the distinction between alienation of income and alienation of 
corpus. A person may alienate income and retain dominium of corpus. Whether or not the 
taxpayer has succeeded in legitimately reducing his incidence of tax depends on the facts of each 
case. The best way of achieving this result is by disposing of the right to income in such a way 
that income never accrues to or in taxpayer's favour who has ceded his right to claim and receive 
the income, and has thus divested himself of that right as in Taxpayer v Commissioner of 
Taxes, Botswana19 where Maisels P noted that : 
" there is an important distinction between a disposal of income after it has accrued to a 
person and the disposal by him of a right under which income would only accrue in future. 
In the former case, as the income has already accrued to the party who disposes of it, it 
remains taxable in his hands. In the latter case, the income accrues to the recipient of the 
right and not to the person who has disposed of the right." 
If a taxpayer contrives matters in such a way that he continues to enjoy the benefits of income, or 
if he continues to control the source or disposition of income , in which case an 'out to out' 
cession has not taken place, he should not be allowed to reduce his liability below what a 
taxpayer in similar circumstances receiving the income would normally expect to pay under the 
tax system as in ITC 137820_ where the taxpayer ceded his right to income from the shares to the 
18 
1947(2) SA 196@ 211-12 
19 43 SATC 118@ 131 
20 45 SA TC 230 
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C fund for a limited duration. 
The commissioner included the dividends paid to the C fund in the gross income of the taxpayer 
because he was of the opinion that it was not possible in law to cede dividends which have not 
yet been declared, this being tantamount to the cession of a mere spes, which he regarded as not 
being permissible. 
Melamet J was of the view that a future right or spes is capable of cession. He went on to say that 
" It is true that the alienation of income without the alienation of the corpus maybe a 
method of tax avoidance, but apart from section 103 there is no provision in the Income 
Tax Act which strikes cessions of the rights to income. In other jurisdictions specific 
legislation has been introduced. As set out above, there was no attempt to apply the 
provisions of section 103 in the present instance." 
Since a tax motive for retaining a continuing interest and control over the disposition of income 
justifies continued taxation ITC 1378 lead to the enactment of section 7(7) which provides that, if 
by reason of any donation, settlement or other disposition by the donor, the donor's right to 
income in respect of any property is ceded to another in such a way that the donor has the right to 
regain ownership of or the interest in the property, such income is deemed to be that of the donor. 
Such income is also deemed to be that of the donor if the donor's right to income is ceded upon 
terms which allow the donor to regain the right. 
In Smith v CIR21 _ the court was of the opinion that alienation of any asset by the taxpayer by 
which income, which would otherwise have accrued to the taxpayer, accrues to another can be 
regarded as having the effect of avoiding, postponing or reducing liability for tax, although the 
taxpayer has no right to or will receive no benefit from the income : 
"by the specific inclusion in unqualified general terms of a transaction, operation or 
21 1964(1) SA 324 A 
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scheme involving the alienation of property, the alienation of income - reducing asset is 
brought within the terms of the section. The effect of such an alienation would ordinarily 
be that income produced after the alienation would not be income of the seller. There 
could, of course, in such a case be some special arrangement by virtue of which it might be 
said that the income produced would in reality and for all practical purposes still be the 
income of the seller, but the generality of the language of the inclusion gives no indication 
of any intention to limit the inclusion to cases of that nature. "
22 
Steyn CJ held further that that : 
"although the income in question not having been produced by the Appellant's capital, may 
not in reality be his income ... his effective control of the companies he formed would enable 
him, at such time as he might consider appropriate, to obtain payment of an equivalent . 
amount to himself, in a form or a manner which would render it free from tax or subject to 
a lesser tax." 
Therefore to counter such a result there must be an out to out cession by which the taxpayer 
antecedently revokes his right to income in such way that income never accrues or is never 
received by him. It is only when the taxpayer's actions do not properly terminate his source of 
income that section 103(1) may be invoked provided that other requirements of the section are 
satisfied. 
4.2 WHICH HAS THE EFFECT OF AVOIDING OR POSTPONING THE 
LIABILITY FOR PAYMENT OF ANY TAX ... OR REDUCING THE AMOUNT 
THEREOF 
The second condition for the successful invocation of the anti - tax avoidance provision is that 
the transaction, scheme or operation must have an effect of avoiding, postponing or reducing the 
liability for the payment of any tax, duty or levy imposed under the Income Tax Act. 
22 supra at 334 
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The landmark decision involving the interpretation of the words "avoiding or postponing 
liability" is Smith v CIR23 where a taxpayer held shares in a company with large undistributed 
reserves that intended declaring a dividend. All the shares of this company were about to be 
exchanged for shares in another company, which would become its holding company. 
The appellant had carried out a series of company re - organisations, with the result that his 
original shareholding in a company which enjoyed a substantial income from the sale of certain 
technical equipment was held by him through some four intermediary companies. 
As anticipated by the taxpayer, the original company declared a dividend to its holding company, 
the holding company declared a dividend to its shareholders, including the South African 
company, and the South African company declared a dividend to the Rhodesian company. As a 
result, dividends declared by the operating company and its immediate holding company were 
absorbed by the intermediary companies and did not swell the appellant's income. The secretary 
invoked section 103, and included in his assessment of the appellant's income dividends which 
had been received by one of the intermediary companies. 
The taxpayer did not dispute the abnormality of these transactions for the purposes of section 103 
and admitted that certain of the transactions were designed to save estate duty and income tax. 
His sole contention was that these transactions or operations did not have the effect of" avoiding 
... liability" for any tax on income and relied on a passage by Watemeyer CJ in CIR v Kini1 
who concluded that the meaning of the words " avoiding liability" was to be found by 
distinguishing the case of a man who so orders his affairs that he has no income which would 
expose him to liability for income tax frorri a case of a man who so orders his affairs that he 
escapes liability for taxation which he ought to pay upon the income which is "in reality his", 
and held, in effect that "the section was to be interpret~d so as to apply to the former." 
Relying on the above passage the appellants' argument in this regard was summed up by Steyn 
23 1964(1) SA 324 A 
24 1947(2) SA 196 A, 14 SATC 184 
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CJ25 in his majority judgment as follows : 
"Counsel for the appellant submitted that they [the words "avoiding liability] bear the 
meaning of preventing liability in respect of accruals or moneys which are, in spite of any 
such transaction or operation, in reality [ my emphasis] still the income of the taxpayer. In 
the present case the dividend off, 6 951 did not accrue to and was not received by the 
appellant. It went to the Rhodesian company, a different persona. He argued that the 
legislation did not intend that a person should by the 
provisions of this section be made be made to pay tax on income which he has not received 
and may never receive, and which is not really his." 
Steyn CJ rejected this contention holding that the introduction of these limitations [the 
abnormality test] was to eliminate, on the whole, the results by which the court was constrained 
to seek a narrower meaning. He went on to say that it was highly improbable that the legislature, 
while widening the general scope of the section, intended not only to 
impose the limitations by which these results are eliminated, but also at the same time to retain 
the restrictions arising from the interpretation adopted in King's case. 
Therefore the court considered that the meaning attached on the words "avoiding liability" in 
King's case was no longer applicable holding that ordinary, natural meaning of the phrase under 
consideration should prevail and Steyn CJ came to the conclusion that : 
"The ordinary meaning of avoiding liability for a tax on income is to get out of the way of, 
escape or prevent an anticipated liability." 
Although the dividend ultimately received by the Rhodesian company was not "in reality" the 
income of the taxpayer but for the transaction in question, the dividend would have come into his 
hands and attracted liability for tax thereon. 
Smith's case, therefore, lays down a principle that it is not a requirement of section 103(1) that it 
be shown that the taxpayer is avoiding the tax on what is "in reality his income" and, therefore, 
25 supra at page 330 
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that any action taken by the taxpayer which has the result of reducing, avoiding or postponing 
his present or anticipated tax liability brings him within the confines of the section irrespective of 
whether he is not the owner of such income or will never lay his hands thereon. 
In Hicklin v SIR26 Trollip JA in considering whether the agreement had the effect of avoiding 
liability for any tax on income, acknowledged that to avoid a liability for a tax on income is to 
"get out of the way of, escape or prevent anticipated liability" as per Steyn CJ who delivered the 
judgment of the court in Smith's case, which stated that it meant " a liability for tax that the 
taxpayer anticipates will or may fall on him in the future". 
Therefore the court accepted that liability for tax may vary from an imminent, certain prospect to 
a vague, remote possibility but held it unnecessary and hence inadvisable to decide whether a 
vertical line should be drawn somewhere along that wide range of meanings inorder to limit the 
meaning of the connotation of "anticipated liability". 
On the facts, therefore, the court held that : 
"It suffices to say that the liability of appellant and the other shareholders to tax on 
Reklame's distributable profits, albeit a liability contingent upon their declaring them as 
dividends, was clearly an 'anticipated liability' within the contemplation of section 103(1 ). 
After all they were always mindful that something unforseen might occur that would 
compel them to declare them as dividends and incur the ensuing tax liability, as, for 
example, the early death of one of them. And, as will presently appear, the possibility of 
some such contingency occurring was sufficiently proximate and pressing to induce them 
to sell their shares under the RN agreement inorder to 'get out of the way of, escape or 
prevent such liability from falling on them. The RN agreement undoubtedly had the effect 
of avoiding that anticipated liability of theirs." 
In Meyeworitz case27 it was held that the income of the Meyeworitz Trust was in its entirety the 
product of appellant's personal labours and that where the taxpayer had by means of 'artificial 
26 
1980(1) SA 481 A 
27 supra 
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manoeuvre' diverted income from himself to his minor children, it was appropriate for the 
commissioner to tax the income in the taxpayer's hands as the person to whom it in reality 
belonged. This is so because where the income is the fruit of the taxpayer's labour or capital or 
both, then that leaves the taxpayer in a position of one to whom income would normally and 
naturally in the ordinary course of the events accrue since income could clearly be traced to the 
appellant's labours. 
Once the commissioner discharges the onus of proving that a transaction, operation or scheme or 
change in shareholding or members' interests had the effect of avoiding or postponing tax it is 
presumed, unless the taxpayer proves otherwise, that he had the req•uisite purpose of tax 
avoidance as per section 103(4) which provides that whenever in proceedings relating to an 
appeal under section 103 it is proved that the transaction, operation or scheme, agreement or 
change in shareholding or members' interests would result in the avoidance or the postponement 
of liability for payment of any tax, duty or levy imposed by the Act or any previous Income Tax 
Act or any other law administered by the commissioner or in reduction of the amount thereof, it 
shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved that : 
(a) in the case of a transaction, operation or scheme, it was entered into or carried out 
solely or mainly for the purpose of such avoidance, postponement or reduction; 
(b) in the case of any agreement or change in shareholding or members' interests, it 
was effected solely or mainly for the purpose of utilising the assessed loss inorder to avoid, 
postpone or reduce the liability for tax. 
4.3 WAS ENTERED INTO OR CARRIED OUT - IN THE CASE OF A 
TRANSACTION, OPERATION OR SCHEME IN THE CONTEXT OF BUSINESS, 
IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD NOT NORMALLY BE EMPLOYED FOR BONA 
FIDE BUSINESS PURPOSES, OTHER THAN THE OBTAINING OF A TAX 
BENEFIT. 
In the Explanatory Memorandum on the Income Tax Bill 1996 clause.29 it is stated that the Katz 
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Commission examined the Anti - tax avoidance provisions of section 103 in depth. It specifically 
referred to the problems specifically experienced with the abnormality test which was seen as not 
covering the schemes which, although initially abnormal, had through common usage and 
commercial acceptability become normal and thus fell outside the scope of the section. It later on 
expressed its concern that there is no disadvantage for taxpayers who enter into a tax avoidance 
transaction, even if successfully challenged by the commissioner. Therefore the tax commission 
recommended the introduction of a "business purpose test" to amend the provisions to make 
them more effective. These recommendations indeed led to the amendment of section 103. 
The 'business purpose' phrase was preferred to the concept of 'trade purposes' because the latter 
would have widened the application of the section and given the commissioner even greater 
powers to interfere with tax avoidance arrangements. Due to the specific inclusions in the 
definition of trade (section 1 - "trade") in the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 the fear that the 
concept of trade may very well be wider than 'business' as to lead to absurd results seems to be 
justified. 
'Trade' is defined as including every profession, trade, business employment, calling, occupation 
or venture, including the letting of any property and the use of or the grant of or permission to 
use intellectual property i.e any patent, design, trade mark, copyright or similar property. 
The 1996 Amendment requires a division of schemes between those : 
- in the context of business 
- and those other schemes which are not in the context of business. 
In the light of the amendment, for the anti - tax avoidance provision not to apply to schemes " in 
the context of business", they must: 
- have a bona fide business purpose, other than the obtaining of a tax benefit, and 
- not create rights or obligations which would not normally be created between dealing at 
arms length under schemes of the kind in question. 
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Therefore a transaction in the context of business will be abnormal either if it was 
concluded or executed in a manner which is normally employed for bona fide business 
purposes except to obtain a tax benefit ,or has created rights or obligations which would 
not normally be created between persons dealing at arms' length. As regards schemes 
falling within section 103(1)(b)(i)( bb) which do not fall "in the context of business" 
inorder to avoid the successful invocation of the anti - tax avoidance provision in section 
103(1) these schemes: 
- must not have been entered into or carried out in a manner not normal in relation to the 
scheme in question, and 
- must not create rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons 
dealing at arms length under the schemes of the kind in question. 
In the invocation of the extended provisions, the two new phrases to be considered are "business 
context" and "bona fide business purpose". 
4.3.1 BUSINESS CONTEXT 
The term "business" is not defined in the Income Tax Act but is included in the definition of 
"trade" which is defined as including : 
"every profession, trade, business, employment, calling, occupation or venture 
including the letting of property ... " 
There has yet been no judicial pronouncement on the meaning to be attached to the phrase 
"business context". Wessels Jin Modderfontein Deep Levels Ltd v Feinstein28 held that: 
"To constitute a business there must either be a definite intention at the first act to carry on 
similar acts from time to time if opportunity offers, or the act must be done not once or 
twice but successively, with the intention of carrying it on, so long as it is thought 
desirable." 
28 1920 TPD 288 @291 
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In Smith v Anderson29 the word business was judicially interpreted as meaning : 
"anything which occupies the time and attention and labour of a man for the purpose of 
profit or improvement." 
The existence of a profit motive is not essential as held in De Beers Holdina:s (Pty) Ltd v CIR30 
where Corbett JA pointed out that: 
"The attainment of profit is not necessarily the hallmark of the trading transaction. 
A trader may for commercial reasons be compelled to resell goods at a loss. 
Conceivably also he may elect to resell goods at a loss inorder to gain some other 
commercial advantage for his business." 
Broomberg argues that "in the context of business", if there is an innocent purpose, it is likely to 
be found in the function of a particular transaction in the economy of the taxpayer. The taxpayer 
may be able to prove, for example , that he embarked upon a transaction inorder to secure import 
permits or labour qoutas, or industrial capacity or to overcome stock exchange committee 
requirements or indeed to avoid the provisions of some other Act of parliament, like section 38 
of the Company's Act : the perennial thorn that bars a company from giving any financial 
assistance for the purpose of the purchase of any shares in the company. 
Therefore the best interpretation of the word 'context' in the phrase "business context" would to 
give it its natural meaning of "in relation to" or "circumstances in which an event occurs". The 
courts will be actively interventionist in this regard and will give these word "business context" 
an interpretation which best suppress the mischief of tax avoidance. 
However, the interpretation of the phrase "carrying on business" is instructive to the 
interpretation by our courts of the meaning "business context". It has been held that the words 
"carrying on business" must be given their ordinary meaning in the commercial sense. Beadle CJ 
29 (1880) 15 ChD 247@ 258 
30 1986(1) SA 8 (A), 47 SATC 229 @30 
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summarised the enquiry in Estate G v Commissioner of Taxes31 as follows: 
"The sensible approach, i think, is to look at the activities concerned as a whole, 
and then to ask the question : Are these the sort of activities which, in commercial 
life, would be regarded as "carrying on• business"? The principal features of the 
activities which might be examined inorder to determine this are the nature, their 
scope and magnitude, their object (whether to make a profit or not), the continuity 
of the activities concerned, if the acquisition of property is involved, he intention 
with which the property was acquired. This list of features does not purport to be 
exhaustive, nor is any one of these features necessarily decisive, nor is it possible 
to generalise and state which feature should carry most weight in determining the 
problem. Each case must depend on its own particular circumstances." 
Therefore whether or not a person is carrying on business is an inference from the totality of facts 
and circumstances, which inference is a matter of law. The courts in interpreting the words 
"business context" will most probably adopt a similar approach. 
4.3.2 BONA FIDE 
It is doubtful whether the addition of the word "bona fide" to the "business purpose" adds much 
force to the meaning of "business purpose" except as to clarify that the business purpose must be 
legitimate and real. In other words it must be done in "good faith". 
4.3.3 BUSINESS PURPOSE 
"Purpose" is to be distinguished both from "effect" and presumably from "motive" in true sense. 
A taxpayer may have tax avoidance motive but the relevant transactions may have a business 
purpose. 
Since there has yet been no judicial pronouncement on the meaning of "business purpose" by our 
31 26 SATC 168@ 173 - 174 
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courts, cognisance must be given to jurisdictional models elsewhere in the world learning from 
their successes and avoiding their mistakes. 
The business purpose test originated in Gre2ory v Helverin~_ . The facts in that case were : 
Miss Gregory owned all stock of United Mortgage Company which in tum owned 1,000 shares 
of Monitor Securities Corporation. Gregory sought to have Monitor shares sold and to have the 
proceeds of sale inure to her personal account. To accomplish these results with a minimum of 
tax liability, Gregory caused United Mortgage to transfer Monitor shares to a newly formed 
subsidiary, Averill, which was distributed to Gregory and then immediately liquidated, leaving 
Gregory in possession of Monitor shares which she then sold. 
Gregory contended that the formation of Averill and the subsequent distribution of the Averill 
stock to her was a tax free re - organisation (defined in section l12(g)(l)(i)(B) of Revenue Act 
of 1928 as including " a transfer the transferor or its stockholders or both are in control of the 
corporation to which the assets are transferred.") and that the only tax significant transaction was 
the liquidation of Averill which resulted in a relatively small capital gains tax to Gregory. The 
subsidiary was brought into being only to die, serving merely as a channel for the passing of 
desired shares from the holding company to its shareholder. 
Despite the fact that the transfer of Averill appeared to meet the statutory language defining a 
reorganisation, the court held that the distribution of Averill was not a reorganisation, and that 
Gregory should be taxed as if she had instead received a dividend taxable at a substantially 
higher ordinary income rates. 
The court explained that the reorganisation provision, which speaks of a transfer of assets by one 
corporation to another, refers only to a transfer made in "in pursuance of a plan of 
reorganisation" of a corporate business, and not a transfer of assets by corporation to another to 
another in pursuance to a plan and having no relationship to business. 
32 293 us 465 (1935) 
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It went on to state that the transaction which had occurred was "simply an operation having no 
business or corporate" purpose and as such "the transaction upon its face lies outside the plain 
intent of the statute." 
The apparent instruction to be gained from the court's language is that a transaction which has 
no business or corporate purpose is not a "reorganisation". Since the Gregory v Helvering33 
appeared to make it clear that one of the essential elements of classification as corporation 
reorganisation was a business purpose, it was claimed that the transaction at issue, lacking the 
essential purpose, could not be so characterised. Gregory case, therefore, lays down a principle 
of tax law that inorder to fit within a particular provision of the statute a transaction must comply 
not only with the letter of the section, but must have a business purpose other than a desire to 
avoid taxes. 
A person would argue that she was driven by a significant business purpose, to which any tax 
advantage would have been secondary. From the standpoint of the commissioner, it is 
unsatisfactory that a taxpayer who can establish some degree of business purpose may succeed in 
obtaining the tax advantage without which he would not have acted at all. It must be doubly 
unsatisfactory that a taxpayer whose tax avoidance purpose is dominant and whose business 
purpose is slight can be saved by the business purpose of the other party to the transaction. It can 
therefore be argued that the new amendment as regards the "business purpose" will afford 
opportunities for tax manipulation. If it evident that a particular loophole is attracting too many 
avoiders, the Revenue must seek to close it. 
The question that faces the courts is whether the business purpose test could be used and 
sustained where the transaction which is inspired by tax avoidance considerations, has so many 
abnormal features that it can no longer be regarded as a transaction. In Bureess v CIR34 the 
court in considering whether the trade requirement was met EM Grrosskopf stated that : 
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the carrying of a trade, he would not in my view, cease to be carrying on a trade 
merely because one of his purposes, or even his main purpose, in doing what he 
does is to obtain some tax advantage.Of course the position might be different if a 
transaction:is so affected or inspired by fiscal considerations that the shape and 
character of the transaction are no longer that of a trading transaction. This is 
clearly not the case here. As I have pointed out, the shape and character of the 
transaction in the present case were inspired entirely by commercial 
considerations." 
Therefore, a business purpose will have to be fundamental and significant enough to withstand 
an attack on the grounds of de minimis principle. Although the court in that case was dealing 
with a trading transaction which is not the issue in our case, the courts decision is relevant in so 
far as it enunciates that in the light of the business purpose test, a taxpayer's tax avoidance 
incentives may be so dominantly operating in the mind of the taxpayer as to outweigh the 
business purpose for entering into a scheme in question. 
Also in CIR v Transport Tradin2 and Terminal Corporation35 Learned Hand J stated that:. 
"in construing words of a tax statute which describe commercial or industrial transactions 
we are to understand them to _refer to transactions entered upon for no other motive but to 
escape taxation." 
In short, therefore, the business purpose test can be said to apply where there is no business 
reason at all in engaging in a particular transaction. A transaction lacks a business purpose if its 
"raison d'etre" is tax reduction, avoidance or postponement. 
In the UK the business purpose test has long been standing and the "business purpose" test was 
applied to attack schemes characterised by a series of pre - ordained, interdependent transactions, 
in which some steps had no commercial purpose, not "no business effect", but were aimed at the 
avoidance of tax and which in the absence of those particular steps it would have been payable. 
35 
( 1949) 17 6 F(2d) 570 , 572 
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It is relevant whether the senes of transactions or scheme involves the achievement of a 
legitimate commercial or business end or effect . 
Lord Brightman in his judgment in Furniss v Dawson36 summed up the position as follows: 
"My Lords, in my opinion the rationale for the new approach is this. In a pre - planned tax saving scheme, no 
distinction is to be drawn for fiscal purposes, because none exists in reality, between (i) series of steps which 
are followed by virtue of an arrangement which falls short of a binding contract, and (ii) a like series of steps 
which are followed through because the participants are contractually bound to take each step seriatim. In a 
contractual case the fiscal consequences will naturally fall to be assessed in the light of contractually agreed · 
results ... Ramsay37 says that the fiscal result is to be no different if the several steps are pre - ordained 
rather than pre - contracted. For example, in the instant case, tax will, on the Ramsay principle, all to be 
assessed on the basis that there was a tripartite contract between the Dawsons, Green jacket and Wood 
Bastow under which the Dawsons contracted to transfer their shares in the operating companies Greenjacket 
simultaneously contracted to transfer the same shares to Wood Bastow for sum in cash. Under such a 
tripartite contract - the Dawsons would clearly have disposed of the shares in the operating companies in 
favour of Wood Bastow in consideration of the sum of money paid by Wood Bastow, with the concurrence 
of the Dawsons, to Greenjacket. Tax would be assessed, and the base of the Greenjacket shares calculated, 
accordingly. Ramsay says that this fiscal result cannot be avoided because the pre - ordained series of steps 
are to be found in an informal agreement instead of a binding contract. 
The day is not saved for the taxpayer because the. arrangement is unsigned or contains the magic words "this is 
not a binding contract" ... Secondly there must be steps inserted which have no commercial (business) purpose 
apart from the avoidance of a liability to tax - not "no business effect." 
Courts have acknowledge the point that tax does not exist in abstract i.e it cannot be divorced 
from practical commercial considerations as in Gilbert v Commissioner of Internal Revenue38 
where the court said that : 
"The Income Tax Act imposes liabilities upon taxpayers based upon their financial 
transactions, and it is of course true that the payment of the tax is itself a financial 
transaction. If, however, the taxpayer enters into a transaction that does appreciably affect 
36 [1984] AC 494 (HL) 515 
37 WT Ramsay Ltd v IRC [1982] AC 300 (HL) 
38 (1957) 248 F(2d) 399, 411 
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his beneficial interest except to reduce his tax, the law will disregard it; for we cannot 
suppose that it was part of the purpose of the act to provide an escape from liabilities that it 
sought to impose." 
4.4 IN THE CASE OF A TRANSACTION, OPERATION OR SCHEME ENTERED 
INTO IN ANY OTHER CONTEXT, WAS ENTERED INTO OR CARRIED OUT IN A 
MANNER WHICH WOULD NOT NORMALLY BE EMPLOYED IN THE ENTERING 
INTO OR CARRYING OUT OF A TRANSACTION, OPERATION OR SCHEME OF 
THE NATURE IN QUESTION OR ALTERNATIVELY HAS CREATED RIGHTS OR 
OBLIGATIONS WHICH WOULD NORMALLY BE CREATED BETWEEN PERSONS 
DEALING AT ARMS LENGTH UNDER THE SCHEMES OF THE NATURE IN 
QUESTION. 
As regards this requirement, the inquiry is still the same as before the 1996 Amendment. Section 
is couched in very comprehensive terms and before the commissioner can successfully invoke 
the section he must be satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances under which the 
transaction, operation or scheme : 
- in the case of any other transaction, operation or scheme, being a transaction, operation or 
scheme not falling within the context of business, by means or in a manner which would not 
normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or 
h · · 39 sc eme m question. 
- alternatively, has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between 
persons dealing at arms length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the 
transaction, operation or scheme in question.40 
To make the anti - tax avoidance provision more effective, the test is framed in the alternative so 
that the Commissioner need only find that one of the abovementioned items has been satisfied 
39 Section 103(1)(b)(i)(bb) 
40 Section 103(1)(b)(ii) 
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inorder to successfully invoke the provision of section 103(1 ). 
The word "normally" is used in section (103)(1)(b)(i)(aa), section 103(1)(b)(i)(bb) and in section 
103(1 )(b )(ii) in the context of transaction, operations or schemes which are supposedly or 
professedly business or trading transactions, operations or schemes and not in the context of 
transaction, operations or schemes which are admittedly not concerned with trade or business but 
simply with obtaining a tax benefit as was held in ITC 111341 
that what must be determined is whether the transaction, operation or scheme is the action of a 
normal businessman. In that case the court held that no businessman would make a loan where : 
(a) interest was left to be agreed upon from time to time: 
" .. .if no agreement could be reached, all that the appellant could have done was to demand 
payment of the capital sum, which might entail loss of interest in the interim;42 
(b) and where the security was inadequate : 
" ... payment of that debt in Northern Rhodesia could never be enforced by 
X investments, owing to exchange control regulations.43 
The court's emphasis on the action of a businessman followed from its finding that: 
"there are several features of this transaction which were not normal, and which would not 
have been incorporated in a similar agreement entered into by ordinary businessmen." 
In Smith v CIR
44 
Steyn CJ suggested that the legislature in framing the abnormality test in 
relation to the question of normality of means, manner, rights and obligations, it must have been 
inspired by Schreiner JA's remarks in CIR v King45 that the mischief sought to be suppressed by 
the general anti - tax avoidance section where he stated that : 
41 30 SATC 8 
42 supra at page 12 
43 Ibid 
44 
supra at page 333 
45 
supra at page 216 
34 
"The section ... is designed to meet the Commissioner's objections to the creation of 
abnormal or unnatural situations, to the detriment of fiscus." 
The abnormality test is to be assessed in the context of and taking into account "the 
circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out." 
Secondly, the section enjoins the application of that criterion in relation to a transaction, 
operation or scheme "of the nature of the transaction, scheme or operation in question". The 
importance of the relevance of this fact was summarized in Hicklin v SIR
46 
by Trollip JA where he stated that : 
"What may be normal because of the presence of circumstances surrounding the entering 
into or carrying out of an agreement in one case may be abnormal in an agreement of the 
same nature in another case because of the absence of such circumstances. The last 
observation is that the problem of normality or abnormality of such matters is mainly a 
factual one. The court hearing the case may resolve it by taking judicial notice of the 
relevant norms or standards or by means of expert or other evidence adduced thereanent by 
either party." 
The "arms length" requirement and the abnormality test are interrelated as noted in Hicklin 's 
case that: 
"In an arms length agreement, the rights and obligations it creates are more likely to 
be regarded as normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged by paragraph (ii). and the 
means or manner employed in entering into it or carrying it out are also more likely to be 
normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged by paragraph (i)." 
In Hicklin v CIR 47 the phrase at "arm's length" was held to connote that "each party is 
independent of the other and, in so dealing, will strive to get the utmost possible advantage out 
of the transaction of himself. The fact of the matter is, parties to a transaction, are not always in 
fact at arms length. This is so where the parties are associated with one another e.g they may be 
46 supra at page 495 
47 supra 
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partners, relatives, associates, or shareholders in the company as in SIR v Geustyn,Forsyth and 
48 Joubert . 
In that case Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert who 'were practising as consulting engineers since 
1961, converted their partnership in 1966 into an unlimited company. The company was formed 
with a share capital of R 5 000 divided into 5000 shares of Rl each, all of which were issued in 
equal shares to the taxpayers who were also the sole directors. 
The practice of a partnership was sold to the company for a goodwill consideration of R240 000, 
and the three former partners were each employed by the company at an annual salary of R 10 
000. The goodwill consideration valued at R 240 000 was credited in equal parts to the loan 
accounts of the former partners, at an interest of 8,5% per annum. In addition each taxpayer 
received an annual director's fees of R 7 500. During the year of assessment up to 28 February 
1967, the company's taxable income was R 72 480 on which the normal company tax would 
have amounted to R 29 136. 
The commissioner invoked section 103(1) of the Income Tax Income and taxed the profits of the 
company in the hands of the taxpayers as he was of the opinion that the formation of the 
company amounted to a scheme which had been entered into with the object of reducing the 
liability to pay tax. The commissioner in so doing ,apportioned the total taxable income of the 
company in equal parts to the partners, and issued the company with an assessment which 
showed that it had no taxable income for the tax year in question. 
The court found in respondents' favour that the provisions of section 103 did not apply and 
found that there was nothing abnormal in either the aforementioned conversion of a partnership 
into an unlimited company or in relation to the latter's undertaking to pay 
R 240 000 for goodwill. The special court came to the conclusion that there was nothing 
abnormal with the transaction as envisaged by section 103 of the Act and that the avoidance, 
reduction or postponement of tax was not a factor which was taken into consideration by the 
48 1963(3) SA 863 A, 25 SATC 287 
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partners in deciding to convert its partnership as an unlimited company. 
As to the means by which and the manner in which the transaction had been entered into, the 
court came to the conclusion that the finding of the Special Court that the transaction in question 
was not abnormal was not one which could not reasonably have been reached from the facts by 
the Special Court. 
Olgivie Thompson CJ went on to say that generally speaking, there is nothing abnormal in 
transferring an existing partnership business to a company : indeed, such a transaction may fairly 
be regarded as relatively common - place in the commercial world. That professional men 
carrying on their profession in partnership should transfer their practice to an unlimited company 
may no doubt at first sight appear to be somewhat extraordinary. 
Not only has the . South African Association of Consulting Engineers of which, as already 
mentioned, the aforenamed three erstwhile partners are members - expressly sanctioned its 
members forming unlimited companies to conduct their practices, but more than half The 
Association's membership has already adopted that form of practice. 
Similarly, it said that more than half of the twenty eight known non - members who are 
practising as consulting engineers are at present registered companies. Nor is this peculiar to the 
Republic; for according to the stated case, the majority of consulting engineers in England. 
Canada, France, Switzerland and Japan practice in corporate form. 
Moreover the stated case shows that the erstwhile partners regarded as considerable the 
advantages to be derived from incorporation, as contrasted with partnership which was liable to 
dissolution consequent upon death, resignation and the like. Such advantage inter alia embraced 
the facility of participation in consortiums of engineers engaged upon large projects, the ability 
to increase the participation in profits by qualified engineer - employees while, at the same time, 
eliminating the necessity to restrict the number of partners to the legal limit of twenty. 
In this last mentioned connection, it is not inapposite to mention that on 1 March 1967 the three 
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original shareholders in respondent sold 1 500 shares to six new shareholders, each receiving 
250 shares. These six new shareholders were all qualified engineers employed by the respondent. 
The admission of more employee - engineers as shareholders was contemplated, and it was 
anticipated that the total number of shareholders would in the forseeable future rise to fifteen. 
In addition to a salary of R 10 000 per annum each, the three aforementioned erstwhile partners 
each received a director's fee of R 7 500 for the tax year in issue and interest calculated at 8,5% 
on their respective loan accounts. All these receipts were, of course, subject to tax. 
The figure of R240 000 for goodwill was arrived at by aggregating three year's profits, a 
computation which, in itself, in not critisized by the Secretary. The absence both of any security 
furnished by the respondent and of any service contracts binding the erstwhile to continue to 
work for respondent is explicable by reason of inherent circumstances that the 
aforenamed erstwhile partners made over their practice to respondent, of which they remained in 
full control.49 
As regards the question whether the rights and obligations were created which would not 
normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length in terms of the transaction of the 
nature of the transaction in question, where the transaction is of a kind which would not normally 
be concluded at arm's length between parties, the test could not be applied as it stands. The 
difficulty encountered in this regard is evident in Geustyn's case50 where Olgivie Thompson 
stated that : 
"Section 103(1) is couched in very comprehensive terms, but, in forming his opinion in relation to sub -
paragraphs (i) and (ii)51 of the section, the secretary is required to have regard "to the circumstances under 
which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out". The criterion of the "persons 
dealing at arms length" mentioned in section 103( 1 )( ii) is, however, not easy of application in a case such as 
the present. For the section enjoins the application of that criterion in relation of a transaction, operation or 
scheme 'of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question'. Yet the court is in the present case 
ex hypothesi concerned with partners who have, in the circumstances outlined above made over their 
49 supra at page 573 - 574 
50 supra at page 574 
51 References to section 103(1)(i) and (ii) to the section before the 1996 amendment. These should be read as 
references tothe current amended section 103(1) (b)(i)(bb) and (ii) . 
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practice, not to an independent third party with whom they would ordinarily deal 'at arm's length', but to an 
unlimited company of which they are sole shareholders and directors and whereof they have full and 
complete control. 
However, in as much as it not essential for the decision of this case to pronounce upon this particular aspect 
of the matter (which was not exhaustively argued before us), I prefer to express no conclusion upon the 
point. I shall accordingly assume, without deciding, in favour of the Secretary that ,despite the Special 
Court's appreciated conclusion that the transaction was 'not abnormal as contempl_ated by section 103 of the 
Act',it erred in law in not finding that the transaction in issue 'created rights or obligations which would not 
normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length' within the meaning of these words as they 
occur in section 103(1)(ii) of the Act." 
The court in CIR v Lou~ _considered this issue and concluded that the special relationship 
between the parties could not be ignored.Corbett JA after quoting from Geustyn's case the 
passage that the court was ex hypothes iconcemed with partners who have made over their 
practice, not to an independent third party but to a company of which they are the sole 
shareholders and directors, went on to say : 
"In such a case should the court, in applying the "normality" yardstick, take account of the special 
relationship between the erstwhile partners and the company which they have formed, or ignore it and apply 
the yardstick as though the company were a stranger? I do not see how the court can ignore this special 
relationship and yet give proper effect to the concluding words of section ( 1 )( ii), viz: 
'under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question ' 
. ., (My italics) 
For it is of very nature of the incorporation scheme that the company to which the practice is sold by the 
partners will have as its shareholders and directors the self same partners and will be controlled by them 
Those are the realities of the situation. Moreover it must be borne in mind that in a case such as the present 
the transaction is a multipartite one to which all the partners and company are parties; and each partner 
contracts both with the company and his fellow partners and seeks to extract from the transaction the best 
possible advantage for himself. (Here I might point out that this case differs from Hicklin's case supra in that 
there the court was considering ( see 494H - 495F ) an agreement which was entered into by parties dealing 
with one another at arm's length and remarks of Trollip JA, particularly at the top of 495, must be read in the 
light of that fact.) 
With this in mind, it does not seem to me that the features stressed by appellant's counsel constitute the 
52 1983(3) SA 551 A, 45 SATC 113 @574 - 575 
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creation of abnormal rights and obligations. As to the arrangement that the payment of the purchase price 
was to be made only as and when the company was in a financial position to do so, there is little else the 
parties could have done. Initially the company had very limited capital and the idea was that it would pay off 
the purchase price out of profits. This it proceeded to do over a period of five to six years. Since the sellers 
were mainly instrumental in earning those profits and were in complete control over the company, it was 
perfectly sound and businesslike arrangement. It was not an arrangement that would not normally have been 
created by persons dealing at arm's length in this type of transaction. The same goes for the non - payment of 
interest on the purchase price."The non - payment of interest increased the profits of the company; and this 
directly benefited the erstwhile partners as shareholders in the company for it enabled the company to pay off 
the purchase price more rapidly. Likewise, in the particular circumstances, there was, in my view, no 
abnormality in the fact that the erstwhile partners gave their services to the company for no previously 
stipulated salaries. As controllers of the company they were able from year to year to determine in their own 
interests what their salaries were to be. The fact that in the tax years under review - and in previous years, it 
would seem - respondent received a salary which was much smaller than his income as a partner had been 
was again a matter of his own choice, in consultation with his co - directors and co - shareholders." 
The court found that subsequent to the incorporation of the company, but independently thereof, 
the credit loans having been exhausted, the company lent the shareholders large sums of money 
out of the profits interest - free, and without security and without any definite conditions of 
repayment. Having regard to all these circumstances ,in terms of 
section 103(1)(b), the court held that the director's loans, seen in the context of the amounts 
allocated to directors by way of salary and dividends, were abnormal both as to the means and 
manner employed in granting them and as to rights and obligations created thereby. The arm's 
length principle is thus relaxed as far as necessary to account for the special relationship between 
the parties. 
It would therefore be wise for the taxpayer in executing a tax avoidance scheme to ensure that he 
takes all the necessary pre - cautions to conclude and execute a transaction in a manner used for 
business purposes and thus ensure that rights and obligations that ensue are those which would 
normally be found between parties who are strangers to one another in a transaction and who are 
striving to get the best possible advantage from the transa~tion. For example, Broomberg 
suggests that the parties get papers and all the necessary documentation in order, even though 
this may be costly it is worth the fuss. Even though the manner employed is that normally used 
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for business purposes, the court still has to consider whether rights and obligations that ensue are 
normal. 
4.4 THE TRANSACTION MUST HAVE BEEN ENTERED INTO OR CARRIED OUT 
SOLELY OR MAINLY FOR THE PURPOSES OF OBTAINING A TAX BENEFIT 
Inorder to successfully invoke the operation of section 103(1) the commissioner must prove that 
the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into solely or mainly for the purposes of 
obtaining a tax benefit. The word 'purpose' must be distinguished from both the 'effect' and 
presumably from 'motive' in the true sense. A taxpayer may have a tax avoidance motive but the 
relevant transaction may have an overriding non - fiscal advantage. 'Purpose' as used in section 
103(1)(c) connotes the reason in the taxpayer's mind for undertaking the transaction i.e his object 
for undertaking the transaction and although a scheme may have the effect of obtaining a tax 
benefit, this effect objectively speaking of avoiding, postponing or reducing liability for tax is 
not necessarily the purpose for which the scheme was entered into. 
As noted in CIR v Pick 'n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trus~_ that in a tax case one is 
not concerned with what possibilities apart from his actual purpose, the taxpayer forsaw and with 
which he reconciled himself. One is solely concerned with his object, his aim and his actual 
purpose. 
Given the subjective nature of purpose it is clear that of utmost importance in ascertaining the 
purpose of the scheme would be the evidence of the taxpayer, the progenitor of the scheme, as to 
why it was carried out. Therefore, the onus in terms of section 82 of the Income Tax Act rests on 
the taxpayer to establish on balance of probabilities, that he did not have the purpose-- set out in 
section 103(1)(c). 
As Colman J observed in SIR v Galla2he~ that the court is n~t bound to accept what the 
taxpayer says, even on oath, with regard to his intentions at a particular time or with regard to 
53 
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any other matter and further noted that : 
''That is true. But, on the other hand, the sworn testimony of a witness, given with the 
appearance of truthfulness and condour, is not lightly to be discarded unless some reason 
appears for disbelieving the witness. What he says may be discarded if there is credible 
evidence to the contrary, or if there are such weighty probabilities against what he has 
deposed to that the court does not feel justified in accepting his evidence. A witness may be 
found to have been wilfully untruthful, or he may be found to have been mistaken or 
confused." 
Therefore, the taxpayer's credibility on this matter will be tested by an inquiry into whether there 
existed objective reasons, unconnected with tax avoidance, for carrying out the transaction. 
Section 103(1)(c) is clear that the requisite tax avoidance purpose under section 103(1) must be a 
sole or main purpose for entering into or carrying out a scheme, operation or transaction in 
question. 
If the transaction entirely lacked such a purpose of obtaining a tax benefit, or if it was present 
merely as an incidental or secondary purpose, section 103(1) would not be applicable as in SIR v 
Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert55 where the court held that , on the facts, there existed various 
reasons, quite unrelated to the incidence of tax, in 
favour of converting the partnership into a company. These reasons included advantages of 
practising in corporate form such as eliminating the necessity to restrict the number of partners 
to the legal limit of twenty; to increase the participation in profits by qualified engineer -
employees and the facility of participation in consortiums of engineers engaged in large projects. 
CHAPTERS 
POWERS OF THE COMMISSIONER UNDER SECTION 103(1} : DETERMINING THE 
55 supra 
42 
LIABILITY FOR THE PAYMENT OF TAX 
If all the requirements for the application of section 103(1) are present, the commissioner is 
obliged to determine the liability for any tax, duty or levy imposed by the Act, and the amount 
thereof in one of the two manners : 
(a) as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out; or 
(b) in such a manner as in the circumstances he deems appropriate for the prevention or 
diminution of the avoidance, postponement or reduction of tax. 
The first requirement can be interpreted in the light of Newton v COT56 where the Privy 
Council in interpreting the Australian tax avoidance section which provides that the arrangement 
which has the effect of avoiding liability for tax is void against the commissioner, was as 
annihilating one and that it was not enough to ignore the transactions which had the effect of tax 
avoidance; the ignoring of the transactions did not in itself create a liability for tax. 
The commissioner had to find income in the hands of the taxpayer as Lord Denning put the 
matter in the following : 
"In this case what is meant is that the commissioner is entitled to disregard the 
arrangement - and the ensuing transactions - so far as they have the purpose or 
effect of avoiding tax. In the words of courts of Australia, it is an "annihilating" 
provision - the commissioner can use the section so as to ignore the transactions 
which are caught by it. But the ignoring of the transactions - or the annihilation o_f 
them - does not itself create a liability to tax." 
While Newton 's case may afford some guidance in the interpretation of the first mentioned 
commissioner's powers, it has no bearing on the words which confer discretion on the 
commissioner as noted in Meyeworitz case57that the alternative provision empowering the 
commissioner to tax in such a manner as in the circumstances of the case he deems appropriate 
for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement or reduction distinguishes the 
56 (1958) 2 ALL ER 759 (PC) 
57 supra 
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South African section from the Australian position. 
The first remedy entitling the commissioner to determine the liability to tax 'as if the transaction, 
operation or scheme has not been entered into or carried out' was applied in Smith's case
58
. In 
that case the taxpayer expected a dividend to be paid on shares which he held in the T company. 
He then incorporated companies A, B and C, which he controlled. The taxpayer sold the shares 
in the T company to company C. The dividend declared by the T company duly accrued to C 
company which declared a similar dividend to company B; but no dividend had yet been 
received by the taxpayer. 
The comm1ss10ner relying on his 'annihilating' powers, ignored the incorporation of the 
intermediate companies B and C and assessed taxpayer's liability for tax as though he had 
received the dividend declared by the T company on the basis that had it not been for the 
offending transactions entered into, the dividend declared by the T company would have come 
into the taxpayer's hands and he would have been liable to tax thereon. 
The commissioner's powers under section 103(1) to determine liability for payment of tax and . 
the amount thereof, as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried 
out have been held to empower the commissioner to select those parts of the transaction as is 
objectionable and which he wishes to ignore for tax purposes, while allowing others to stand for 
this purpose, so long as he does not act a so as to expose the taxpayer to double taxation as laid 
down in H v COT59 that : 
''The commissioner may, if he wishes, pull down the whole artificial edifice 
which has been erected by the taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding tax, but if in 
the circumstances it is not appropriate to do that, he can pull down part of that 
edifice and tax on the basis that part of the edifice had never existed, while at the 
same time leaving in existence another part of the edifice and accept tax from that 
part as if that part was a legitimate structure in the taxpayer's business. He can do 
58 
supra 
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this always provided that the result is not to subject any portion of the taxpayer's 
income to double income tax, because were he to do this he would not be acting in 
a fair and appropriate manner, as this section is not a penal one." 
This decision is the correct statement of the commissioner's powers, both alternatives presuppose 
the existence of income which can be taxed in the hands of the taxpayer by removing or ignoring 
all or part of the structure erected by the taxpayer in terms of the transaction, operation or scheme 
in question. It is considered that this does not empower the commissioner to create, or to subject 
to tax notional income which in fact does not exist as the court noted in Meyeworitz case
60 
that: 
"to restore the company notionally to the register and then to attribute to it a notional 
income would in these circumstances be an extremely artificial and umealistic manner of 
determining the appellant's liability to tax, I cannot think that section 90 [now section 103] 
intended such a result." 
Similarly the commissioner cannot exercise his powers under section 103(1) so as to increase 
tax. 
The court in CIR v Louwfil took a contrary view and held that the commissioner was entitled to 
apply section 103 to the loans simpliciter and assess the taxpayer's additional income tax liability 
accordingly and in so doing he would determine what amount, but for the loans, the taxpayer 
would have received by way of an additional salary and/or dividend from the company in each of 
the tax years in question. 
This approach empowers the commissioner to act ultra vires and to create taxable income which 
does not in fact exist and subjecting to tax of loans which are amounts amounts of a capital 
nature and which clearly do not form part of the gross income.62 
60 supra 
61 1983(3) SA 551 (A), 45 SATC 113 
62 Silke at paragraph 19;14 is of the view that the commissioner has not the power under section 103(1) to change 
the nature of the receipt from capital to income and subject the taxpayer to tax as ifhe had received income. 
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CHAPTER6 
SECTION 103(2) TRAFFICKING IN ASSESSED LOSS AND THE 
COMMISSIONER'S POWERS TO DISALLOW A SET OFF OF COMPANY'S 
ASSESSED LOSS AGAINST INCOME. 
'Assessed loss' means any amount by which the deductions admissible exceeded the income in 
respect of which they are so admissible. 
63 
Section 103(2) was enacted inorder to counter a tax avoidance transaction commonly known as 
"trafficking an assessed loss". 
Section 103(2) provides that : 
"Whenever the commissioner is satisfied that any agreement affecting any company or any change in 
shareholding in any company or in the members' interests in any company which is a close corporation, as a 
direct or indirect result of which income has been received by or has accrued to that company during any 
year of assessment, has any time before or after the commencement of this Income Tax Act, 1946, been 
entered into or effected by any person solely or mainly for the purposes of utilising any assessed loss or any 
balance of assessed loss incurred by the company, inorder to avoid liability on the part of that company or 
any other person for the payment of any tax, duty or levy on income, or to reduce the amount thereof, the set 
off of any such assessed loss or balance of assessed loss against any such income shall be disallowed." 
The mischief which section 103(2) sought to remedy is laid out by D.M Steward in his 
article 'The Prohibition of Tax Avoidance : An Evaluation of Section 103 of the South Africa 
Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962'64 where he states that: 
"The reason for this subsection is that elsewhere in the Act [ section 20] it is 
recognized that to divide a taxpayer's business up into separate yearly 
compartments is largely artificial, and, as a result, where in one year allowable 
63 Section 20(2) 
64 (1970) 3 CILSA 168 @189 
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deductions exceed income, the taxpayer may carry the balance of deductible 
excess forward as an "assessed loss". This loss may be deducted from income 
earned in the next or subsequent year. As a result, certain taxpayers, whose 
businesses have failed to profit, build up large assessed losses. Where these 
taxpayers are individuals the Revenue has nothing to fear for the assessed loss is 
not itself transferable, but where the taxpayer is a company, whose shares can 
readily change hands, new proprietors will attach themselves to the company and 
inject new income into it inorder to exploit the assessed loss. It is this 
"trafficking" in the shares of companies with assessed loss which gave rise to the 
enactment of section 103(2)." 
Therefore, before section 103(2) can apply the commissioner must be satisfied of the following : 
(a) an agreement affecting any company has been entered into; or 
(b) a change in the shareholding of any company or in the members' interests in any 
close corporation has taken place; and 
( c) as a direct or indirect result of the agreement or change in shareholding, income has 
been received by or has accrued to the company concerned during the year of assessment; 
and 
( d) the agreement has been entered into, or the change in shareholding effected solely or 
mainly for the purpose of utilising any assessed loss or any balance of assessed of loss 
incurred by the company concerned inorder to avoid liability, or to reduce the amount of that 
liability, for the payment of any tax, duty or levy on income by the company concerned or 
any other person. 
The section may only be successfully invoked if the above requirements are satisfied. 
Section 103(4) further provides that where it is proved that the agreement or change m 
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shareholding or reduction or postponement of liability for the payment of any tax imposed by the 
Act or under any other Act administered by the Commissioner, it is presumed, until the contrary 
is proved, that the agreement or change in shareholding was effected solely or mainly for the 
purpose of utilising the assessed loss concerned to avoid, reduce or postpone liability for tax. 
In terms of section 103(2) a set off is claimable unless the sole or main purpose is the avoidance 
or reduction or postponement of liability for tax. In other words, for the section to operate the 
avoidance, reduction or postponement of liability for tax must at least have been the principal 
purpose of the taxpayer. If a sound commercial reason can be advanced, that the taxpayer was 
moved by non - tax considerations to take over the company with an assessed loss ,and if it can 
be shown that the existence of the assessed loss was merely incidental to the main purpose of the 
transaction or scheme, section 103(2) will not apply. 
As Meyeworitz that if for example the main purpose was to obtain the benefit of the company's 
assets, or goodwill, or trademarks, permits and the like, in other words, if there was some good 
business reason for the agreement or change in shareholding, the fact that the assessed loss was 
also taken into account, but was merely subsidiary, will not invoke the operation of section. 
65 
In ITC 98366 all the shares in the appellant company which manufactured clothing were bought 
by another company in the same line of business which also manufactured clothing. The 
appellant company had an assessed loss. During the year that ended on 30 June 1958, the 
appellant company ceased its activities, but recommenced the business of clothing 
manufacturing which it had previously carried on, during the following tax year. The company 
manufactured garments at a fixed price per article for the controlling company. 
The company showed a profit of L 3 839. Purporting to act in terms of section 90(1)(b) [now 
section 103(2)] of the Income Tax Act, the commissioner refused to allow a set off of an assessed 
# 
loss brought forward in determining the taxpayer's taxable income for the year ended 30 June 
1959 and assessed the taxpayer in respect of a taxable income of L 3 839. 
65 paragraph 29 .11 
66 25 SATC 55 
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On appeal the taxpayer succeeded because the court was satisfied that although the avoidance Of 
reduction of tax was one of the purposes, it was not the main purpose inter alia the object of 
utilising the assessed loss to diminish the amount of tax payable was subordinate to the main 
purpose with which the shares had been acquired, that is, to increase the efficiency and 
productivity by acquiring a production unit which could go into immediate operation to 
supplement the taxpayer's own production capacity. 
Broomberg67 warns that in such cases it would be more than dangerous to refer to an assessed 
loss in the agreement of sale , for example, by way of inserting a warranty by the seller that the 
assessed loss is "good" or by providing for a reduction in the purchase price if the assessed loss 
is forfeited or paying more for the shares in the assessed loss company than they are worth. 
Section 103(2) applies not only to income diverted from another entity to the taxpayer, but also 
to income produced by by the company's own activities as a result of change in shareholding. 
The view that section 103(2) did not apply where the company with an assessed loss commenced 
a new business thereby earning fresh income because the new shareholders are able to and do 
conduct the business more efficiently or undertakes anew enterprise or venture, was rejected in 
ITC 112368 . 
In ITC 1123, the taxpayer acquired control of the appellant company which had a large assessed 
loss at the time when the company had no finance, no assets, no liabilities, no premises, and at a 
time when its business of manufacturing had ceased. To this company he divested income from 
other sources and launched it upon an entirely new kind of business and the same time caused the 
company to commence earning income afresh on its own behalf. 
While the counsel for the appellant company was of prepared to concede that the divested 
income was wholly taxable, he submitted that the assessed loss ought to be set off against the 
remaining income. Trollip J, however was of the opinion that the section was drawn broadly 
enough to catch both types of income and considered that section 103(2) was wide enough to 
67 at page 217 
68 31 SATC 48 
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include income produced by the company with an assessed loss by its own activities m 
contradistinction to income diverted to it. 
Trollip J, further remarked that: 
"The section was intended to apply where income was diverted from another person to a 
company inorder to avoid liability for tax on their part of that person is clear from its very 
language. But its wording is wide and there is no warrant for limiting its application to 
such cases. It refers in the first place to 'income . .. received by or .. . accrued to that 
company during any year of assessment ... '. That is wide enough to include income 
produced by its own activities in contradistinction to avoiding liability for tax 'on the part 
of ... any other person'; that shows not only diverted income but income produced by the 
company's own activities can fall within the ambit of the section if other requirements are 
fulfilled." 
As to the submission that where a company with an assessed loss earned income afresh by the 
company's own activities, it thereby rendered itself immune from any charges of tax avoidance, 
Trollip's brief answer was that tax avoidance lay in the exploitation of an assessed loss created 
by the "old and discontinued business of the company under its erstwhile shareholders." 
By utilising such an assessed loss the new proprietor was avoiding tax on income which he 
would otherwise have had to pay. Otherwise, as the court pointed out, the income from a new 
and unrelated type of business started by new shareholders of the company with the assesses loss 
who acquired the shares solely or mainly for the purpose of using loss would escape taxation. 
The section envisages continuity in setting off of assessed loss. Where, in any year of 
assessment, for any reason this continuity was interrupted, then there was no 'balance of assessed 
loss" for that year which was capable of being carried forward into the following year. In other 
words, the essential continuity was fatally interrupted as held in New Urban Properties Ltd v 
SIR69 . In that case Beyers JA explained that the fatal interruption could occur in two ways : 
69 1966(1) SA 219 (A), 27 SATC 175 
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"In the SA Bazaars case70 that interruption occurred through the taxpayer ceasing 
to trade in a particular year and therefore it was not competent for it to set off in 
its income tax return for that year the balance of assessed loss incurred by it in the 
previous years. In the present case it has occurred through the operation of section 
90(l){b) [the forerunner and, substantially, equivalent of section 103(2)] which 
prohibited the balance of assessed loss from being set off against the only income 
received by the appellant, in respect of the only trading activities conducted by it." 
The effect of the section was, therefore, not merely to disallow the set off for the year of 
assessment concerned, but to eliminate or extinguish it altogether . in the same manner as if 
trading had not been carried on during the year of assessment in question in terms of section 
20(1)71 
The section expressly provides that the set off which is to be disallowed is not against all 
the income of the company concerned, but only against 'such' income as is caught by the section 
and if a company should have any other income, its assessed loss may be set off against such 
income. 
For clarity, we have to distinguish between 'tainted' income and 'untainted' income. Income 
which falls foul of section 103(2) or which for any reason cannot be set off and balanced in any 
particular year, is called 'tainted' income and in that year the carrying forward of an assessed loss 
is "fatally interrupted"72 and if the company does not earn any 'untainted' income for the whole 
of the year of assessment, then the assessed loss is irretrievably lost. 
If the income of the current year of assessment includes both 'tainted' and 'untainted' income, 
then losses incurred in the current year of assessment and the balance of the prior year's assesses 
losses can be set off against the untainted income. Thus it is possible for a company to be issued 
70 SA Bazaars (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1952 (4) SA 505 (A), 18 SATC 240 
71 SA Bazaars case supra 
72 SA Bazaars case and New Urban Areas case supra 
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with two assessments by the commissioner : one showing income which is not set off against and 
the other reflecting the position after income which is not affected by section 103(2) has been set 
off against the assessed loss. 
Therefore, the tax planning implications are clear : it is possible to preserve assessed loss and 
keep it alive by reason of a continued cashflow of untainted income from a business conducted 
before and after section 103(2) attack and which business continues unchanged after the 
successful section 103(2) attack. It is therefore important that the target company retain pre -
existing assets which are capable of generating 'untainted' income and which will continue to 
produce 'untainted' income inspite of the successful section 103(2) attack.73 
The words 'any agreement affecting any company' in section 103(2) cannot be restricted to 
agreements affecting the control of the company or affecting any person's right to participate in 
the profits or dividends of the company. 
In CIR v Ocean Manufacturing Ltd 74 the court was of the opinion that section 103(2) should 
be construed in such a manner as to advance the mischief against which it was directed and that 
there was nothing in section 103(2) to suggest that the word "any" should be used in the limited 
sense. 
The court held that section 103(2) was applicable even where there was no change in the 
shareholding of taxpayer's company, but an agreement was entered into whereby the existing 
business that was conducted by the corporate shareholders of the company with an assessed loss 
was sold to the latter company inorder to utilise its assessed loss for tax avoidance purposes. 
Therefore, where there has been a change in the shareholding, section 103(2) can apply even if 
the agreement or change in shareholding was not the cause of the subsequent earning of income. 
In Conshu (Pty) Ltd v CIR 75 Harms J held that the word "income" used in the introductory 
73 Broomberg on page 219: Tax Strategy 
74 1990(3) SA 610 (A), 52 SATC 151@2618 
75 1994(4) SA 603 (A), 57 SATC 1 
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part of section 20(1) is not used in its defined sense but rather as the income taxable but for the 
set off. In other words a set off in terms of section 20 can only arise if there would otherwise 
have been taxable income i.e a pre - tax profit. That is, to determine whether an assessed loss 
exits in any year of assessment in carrying on in the Republic any trade, one has to subtract 
deductions from income as defined i.e gross income minus exempt income; then further minus 
deductions from income and see whether one gets a positive amount (taxable income) or a 
negative amount of a deductible excess which represents an assessed loss. 
Harms JA's use of the word "pre - tax profit" must not be interpreted to mean that if losses are 
made in successive years the assessed loss from the previous year would be lost merely because 
the taxpayer showed no profit in the following tax year. According to section 20(1)(a) a balance 
of assessed loss incurred in any previous year of assessment can be carried forward from the 
preceding year provided the taxpayer preserves untainted income so that in each succeeding year 
a balance can be struck to the satisfaction of the commissioner which can then be carried forward 
from year to year until it is exhausted. 
The point that continuity in setting off assessed loss can be maintained even if the taxpayer 
shows no profit in the succeeding year of assessment is illustrated by Schreiner's dicta in Louis 
Zinn Or2anisation (Pty) Ltd76 where he stated the position as follows: 
"Wherever there has been a trading loss in the tax year, or where there has been a 
balance of assesses loss brought forward from the previous year, there has to be a 
determination of a balance of assessed loss to be carried forward into the next 
year. There may have been a profit in the tax year but not large enough to 
obliterate the balance of assessed loss carried over from the previous year. Then 
the new balance of assessed loss will be smaller than the previous one. If there has 
been a working loss in the tax year the balance to go forward will be increased." 
The Commissioner has no time limits at to when he can invoke section 103(2) i.e irrespective of 
when a section 103(2) agreement was entered into. In Conshu case77 the question before the court 
76 




concerned the time as to when the Commissioner was entitled to exercise his discretionary 
powers i.e whether the Commissioner not having applied the provisions of the section during the 
year of assessment in which the section 103(2) agreement had been entered into, was entitled to 
apply it in respect of the succeeding year of assessment. 
If regard is had to the wording of section 103(2) tax avoidance provision, in the light of the 
mischief which it seeks to remedy, it contains no limitation as time and does not state that failure 
by the Commissioner to have applied section 103(2) provisions in the year of the agreement bars 
him from doing so in any future year of assessment. 
Harms JA noted that there was: 
" ... no occasion for the Commissioner to disallow the set - off of any assessed loss or 
balance of assessed loss during the 1985 year of assessment. In addition, the taxpayer had 
no taxable income during 1985 against which the assessed loss could have been set off." 
He further concluded the position as follows : 
"To hold that because the Commissioner could not have applied section 103(2) to the 1985 
year entails that he could also not have done it in relation to 1986 would be destructive of 
I 
the purpose of the provision. It would also allow for the evasion of the provision." 
The operation of section 103(2) can be summed up as follows : 
(a) The section applies to any agreement of any kind which affects a company, whether that 
agreement relates to shareholding, dividends or any other aspect of the company or its 
business and is not restricted to an agreement which affects the control of the company or 
one which affects any person's right to participate in the profits or dividends of the 
company. 
The initial requirement is therefore all embracing and widely stated and should , therefore, be 
construed in such a way as to advance the remedy provided by the section and suppress the 
mischief against which the enactment is directed. This will bring within the net of the section 
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every transaction or agreement of any sort entered by a company with an assessed loss and 
affecting the company itself. 
(b) It is common cause that in addition to the first requirement, the transaction must lead to 
the receipt or accrual of income in the company. Given the fact thatconsiderable trafficking 
in company' s losses has the effect of enabling taxpayers to reduce their tax liability by 
transferring profitable businesses to companies which they have taken over with 
accumulated assessed losses, usually income is received on which tax would otherwise 
have been payable but for the agreement or change in shareholding. 
The requirement is not met if any agreement, change in shareholding or transaction entered 
into does not give rise to the receipt or accrual of income to the company in consequence 
thereof. 
(c) Finally, of importance is the existence of the tax avoidance purpose of trafficking in 
assessed loss which must be satisfied for the successful invokation of section 103(2), 
unless the taxpayer can prove existence of some commercial or business reason unrelated 
to the incidence of tax for the agreement or transaction carried out. 
In terms of section 103( 4) of the Act, any decision by the commissioner in terms of section 
103(2) is subject to objection and appeal. 
Section 103(4) in addition provides that when in the proceedings relating to such an 
objection and appeal it is proved that the agreement, change in shareholding or members' 
interests in question would result in the avoidance, or the postponement of liability for 
payment of any tax, duty or levy imposed by the Act or any other law administered by the 
commissioner, or in the reduction of such tax, duty or levy, it is presumed until proved 
otherwise, that the agreement or change in shareholding or members' interests was entered 
into or effected solely or mainly for the purpose of utilising the assessed loss or the balance 
of assessed loss in question, inorder to avoid, reduce or postpone the relevant tax liability. 
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The onus is on the taxpayer to prove the contrary on balance of probabilities.If section 
103(2) is successfully invoked, section 103(6) provides that where the transaction, 
operation or scheme was entered into or carried out, or the agreement was entered into or 
effected after 2 July 1996, the commissioner is prohibited from remitting, in terms of 
section 89quat(3) or (3A), any interest payable on the shortfall in provisional tax because 
of the successful application of section 103(2). 
CHAPTER 7 
SUCCESSFUL APPLICATION OF SECTION 103 : IMPOSITION OF 
SECTION 89OUAT INTEREST 
Before the 1996 Amendment the taxpayer had nothing to lose on successful invokation of section 
103 but at worst was burdened with the liability for tax which he would have borne in the first 
instance had he not entered in the section 103 tax avoidance scheme. The discretion granted to 
the commissioner in terms of section 89 quat (3) and (3A) whereby he may direct that interest 
shall not be paid has been seriously circumscribed. 
With effect in respect of the transactions, operations or schemes entered into or carried out after 2 
July 1996 78, section 103( 6) prohibits the commissioner from exercising his discretion in terms of 
the provisions of section 89quat(3) or (3A) so as to direct that interest shall not be payable in 
respect of so much of the tax as is attributable to the application of section 103. 
Section 89quat provides for interest to be paid on the shortfall between the amount of tax 
assessed in respect of a year of assessment and the provisional tax paid in respect of that year of 
assessment; but subsections (3) in particular require the commissioner to exercise his discretion, 
if he is satisfied that the circumstances warrant such action, to direct that no interest should be 
paid in respect of the shortfall to the extent that it can be attributable to tax on the amount of 
78 The promulgation of the Income Tax Act 36 of 1996 
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income not included by the taxpayer in her return or a deduction or allowance claimed by her 
where she had on reasonable grounds contended that the amount should not have been included 
or that the deduction or allowance should have been allowed. 
According to A.R. Ilersic 79 in his article on tax avoidance he stated that : 
"people must be made to understand that if they defraud the Revenue they are committing a 
mean and despicable offence against every one of their fellow taxpayers. The offender 
should be made by his punishment to feel the ignominy and disgrace attaching to the crime 
he has committed." 
Therefore, the mischief sought to be cured by the enactment of section 103(6) in imposing 
interest is that, after a period of grace in which the exact liability for tax may be calculated, the 
taxpayer enjoys the use of moneys due to the Revenue and so should be charged interest. The 
taxpayers will thus in the light of section 103( 6) think twice before implementing a tax avoidance 
scheme because failed schemes either of a general nature or concentrated upon use of assessed 
loss will fall foul of section 103( 6) and the taxpayer will have to pay normal tax and also interest 
on it, calculated under section 89quat. 
Therefore, section 89quat interest is more than just an interest payable but it is also a penalty. 
7.1 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 103(6} 
Meyeworitz80 expressed his concern that section 103(6) can be challenged as unconstitutional. 
He states that the denial of the benefit of section 89quat(3) to a taxpayer merely because section 
103 is applied without regard to the reasonableness of his grounds is unfair discrimination and 
cannot be supported as an exception to the equality clause section 9 of the Final Constitution, 
which directs that no person shall be discriminated against directly or indirectly, as being 
reasonable and justifiable in terms of section 36 of the Final Constitution. 
79 1979 on page 35 
so at paragraph 29.5A 
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Tax avoidance is not a culture that we should encourage and the growth of this industry has led 
to loss of millions. Tax avoidance leads to decline in public morality, it lowers respect for law 
and for decent communal behaviour. It forces the Revenue to spend much time, more money and 
effort in devising and amending tax statutes and complex administration and inspection systems 
like South African Revenue Services. 
Seen in this context, imposition of section 89quat interest on section 103 schemes seems 
justifiable and reasonable in an open and democratic society under section 36(1) of the 1996 
Final Constitution. 
Of relevance, also, is the decision of the court in Mirhadizadeh v Ontario81 where Blair JA 
described the Canadian position, as regards the Equality Clause, as follows : 
"The mere fact that legislation may treat one group of Canadians differently from another 
is not sufficient to invoke the protection of the section. Indeed Andrew 's82 judgment 
recognizes the obvious fact that governments and legislatures must make distinctions and 
treat groups differently. 
As McIntyre J said at page 13 : it is not every distinction or differentiation in treatment of 
law which transgress the equality guarantees of Section 15 of the Charter. It is, of course 
obvious that the legislatures may - and to govern effectively - must treat different 
individuals and groups in different ways. Indeed, such distinctions are one of the main 
preoccupations of the legislatures. The classifying of individuals and groups, the making 
of different provisions respecting such groups, the application of different rules, 
regulations, requirements and qualifications to different persons is necessary for 
governance of modern society." 
Of importance also is a passage by Greene, M.R., in the judgment of the court in case of 
81 (1989) 60DLR (4th) 597 @600 
82 Andrew v The Law Society of British Columbia 1989(1) SCR 143 
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Lord Howard De Wadde v Inland Revenue Commissioners
83 
, where he stated: 
"For years a battle of manoeuvre has been waged between the Legislature and those who 
are minded to throw the burden of taxation off their shoulders on to those of their fellow 
subjects. In that battle the Legislature has often been worsted by the skill, determination 
and resourcefulness of its opponents of whom the present appellant has not been the least 
successful. It would not shock us in the least to find that the Legislature has determined to 
put an end to the struggle by imposing the severest of penalties. It scarcely lies in the 
mouth of the taxpayer who plays with fire to complain of burnt fingers." 
CHAPTERS 
OBJECTION, APPEAL AND ONUS 
A decision of the commissioner in regard to the anti - tax avoidance sections, sections 103(1) and 
103(2), is subject to objection and appeal.84 
The presumption in section 103(4) casts a burden of proof on the taxpayer, creating a~ 
presumption in favour of the commissioner. The onus is discharged on balance of probabilities. 
Since this presumption arises only when it is proved that the avoidance, postponement or 
reduction of tax would result from the transaction, operation or scheme [ in terms of section 
103(1)], or the change in shareholding or agreement affecting the company [ in terms of section 
103(2)], it is considered that the onus of proving this effect lies on the commissioner. 
The onus of proving the abnormality of the transaction, operation or scheme also lies upon the 
commissioner. In Hicklin v SIR85 the court noted that the issue of normality and abnormality was 
mainly a factual one, and stated that: 
"The court hearing the case may resolve it by taking judicial notice of the relevant norms 
or standards or by means of the expert or other evidence adduced thereanent by either 
83 [1942] 1 KB 389 at 397 
84 section 103(4) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
85 supra 
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party. It is unnecessary to decide what happens if at the end of the day, because of the lack 
of its own knowledge or such evidence, the court cannot resolve the problem." 
This is in contrast to the normal rule that the onus lies upon the taxpayer. 
86 
Moreover, since it is 
the commissioner in terms of the Act, who must form an opinion that the transaction, operation 
or scheme is abnormal, it seems reasonable that the onus of so proving should lie with him. 
CHAPTER9 
ARTIFICIAL TAX AVOIDANCE: SUBSTANCE OVER FORM- A NEW APPROACH .. 
TOT AX AVOIDANCE 
On the issue of simulated transactions entered into for the purposes of obtaining a tax benefit, 
Silke87 correctly states the position as follows : 
"As regards disguised transactions entered into for the purpose of tax evasion, the fiscus is 
sufficiently protected by common law, in that a court will not hesitate to strip the 
transaction of its disguise and expose the true nature or,substance of the contract." 
\ ' 
~ ~ tfl)(tf;;;b~ 
There are principles under which tax avoidance or tax planning schemes may be open to attack 
under the common law : 
(a) The 'sham' principle, 
(b) The 'substance over form' approach, and 
(c) The principle of 'lifting the corporate veil' 
(a) A sham transaction is one that never occurred. The transaction is ineffective, regardless of 
what would otherwise be the true legal nature of the transaction. Frequently a transaction will be 
disregarded because it is fraud or nullity, rather than a sham. But occasionally the courts will 
ignore or give a different effect to the transaction on the basis that although it appears to be real 
86 section 82 
87 
Silke on South African Income Tax 11 Mem Ed (1989) at paragraph 19.1 @ 19 - 2 
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and effective, it is not what it is made out, to the world, to be. 
(b) If not a sham, a scheme may likely be open to attack under the second principle of common 
~
law, which is now very important following the judgment in Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith and 
another v CIR88!. In Dadoo Ltd and others v Krui:ersdorp Municipal Council 89_ Innes CJ 
stated the principle of substance over form as follows : . 
' E'.vl'J 
"A transaction is in frauaem legis when it is designedli d_e_signed so as to escape the 
provisions of the law, but falls in truth within these provisions. Thus stated the rule is 
merely a branch of the fundamental doctrine that the law regards the substance rather than 
orm of things - a doctrine common, one would think, to every system of jurisprudence 
conveniently expressed in the maxim plus valet quod agitur quam qoud simulate 
, ,, )f V\ot-- i..--. f'-v,,.~ ~':s - \.Ook -I-- <Ji.cw "'zy-~ ( If \..t.9,,,,/ 
b!..- conczpztur. \:::>"4½ ~ er ,,..,..,·s1~ .... {,c,tJk c,J., -a--
~ ~1-,,,.~, ~ i,.-,;,..__:,-,..._,~ e,-~ Sh.h~ 
:1~~ v~ .f-i,,1.,._ 
~> \f 1> i'~ ~etc-..~•:!> - •j~M'.~~ ~z~~ ~ ~ 
The idea is that the courts and the commissioner may disregara the strict legal consequences of a 
particular transaction in a tax avoidance exercise ,representing the form, and will instead look to 
the economic reality,Jhelfft%stance and the en<:l resµ!! of the scp.e!!_l~. i~ questi~n. 
A . 
(c) The 'lifting of the corporate veil' principle can be invoked only where art avoidance exercise 
involves the use of a company. The basis of the principle is that in certain circumstances the 
separate legal personality enjoyed by the company can be ignored, so that the acts and assets of 
the company may be treated as those of its shareholders._ Given the wide application of the 'form 
over substance' approach, the lifting of the corporate veil principle is likely to be ofless practical 
importance in the field of tax avoidance because the 'substance over form' approach can often 
achieve for the Revenue all that the 'lifting the corporate veil' principle can similarly achieve. 
This was the case in Lon2 Oak Ltd v Edworks (Pty) Ltd 90 where the court found that the 
plaintiff company was infact an instrument created by Home which was being used by him to 
conduct his own personal affairs. The court observed that notwithstanding the existence of the 
88 1996(3) SA 942 (A), 58 SATC 229 
89 1920 AD 530 @547 
90 1994(3) SA 370 (SE) 
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plaintiff company as a separate legal persona (juristic person), the existence of a company used 
merely as a mask to hide the features of some other person, will be ignored. 
9.1 THE UNITED KINGDOM POSITION 
In the United Kingdom there is no statutory general anti - tax avoidance measure, but the courts 
became highly interventionist and developed a 'substance over form' approach in an attempt to 
curb tax avoidance. Sir Peter Millett in his article on _"Artificial Tax A voidance"91 notes that 'by 
the 1970's, sophisticated tax avoidance had reached such heights of artificiality and absurdity, 
that many schemes, brilliantly concerned and executed by leading practitioners, cried aloud for 
the simple person's reaction: Don't be silly!' 
The basic principle, for which the classic authority was the Duke of Westminster case92, was that 
the form of transactions could not be ignored whatever the underlying substance. In the Duke of 
Westminster case the Duke had executed deeds of covenant in favour of employees of an amount 
equal to their wages, on the understanding that the employees would accept payment under the 
covenants in lieu of wages. The Revenue challenged the scheme, arguing that the Duke ought not 
to be allowed to deduct the payments made under the covenant, because they were in substance 
payments as wages instead of covenanted payments, he should be taxed 'as if he had done so. 
This argument was rejected. It was held to contravene the fundamental principle that a person 
must be taxed by reference to what he or she has actually done, and not by reference to what she 
or he might have done, but did not do, to achieve the same result. Lord Russell, after stating that 
the Inland Revenue conceded that the deeds were genuine and thus not a sham went on to say : 
"The commissioners and Mr Justice Finlay took the opposite view on the ground that, as 
they saw it, looking at the substance of the thing the payments were payments of wages. 
This simply means that the true legal position is disregarded and a different legal right and 
liability which the parties have created ... If all that is meant by the doctrine is that having 
91 • 
(1988)5 Australian Tax Forum on page 8 
92 19 TC 490, [1936]AC 1 
62 
once ascertained the legal rights of the parties you may disregard mere nomenclature and 
decide the question of taxability and non - taxability in accordanc.e with legal rights, well 
and good ... If on other hand the doctrine means that you may brush aside deeds, disregard 
the legal rights and liabilities arising under a contract between parties and decide the 
question of taxability or non - taxability upon the footing of rights and liabilities of the 
parties being different from what in law they are, then I entirely dissent from such a 
doctrine. "93 
On the other hand. Lord Tomlin in dismissing the Revenue's arguments stated that: 
"This so called doctrine of 'substance' seems to me to be nothing more than an attempt to 
make a man pay notwithstanding that he has so ordered his affairs that the amount of 
sought from him is not legally claimable."94 
Lord Tomlin's use of the word 'substance' in the Duke of Westminster case was misunderstood 
as authority for the proposition that, in English tax law, form was to be preferred to substance 
and gave rise to two allied and dangerous myths : 
- that in tax cases, to an extent unknown in other areas of law, form prevails over 
substance; and 
- that the substance of the transaction and the only thing to be regarded, is its legal effect. 
The doctrine of substance over form was formulated by the House of Lords in W . T Ramsay v 
Inland Revenue Commissione~. Lord Wilberforce said : 
"Given that a document or transaction is genuine, the court cannot go behind it to some 
supposed underlying substance.This is the well known principle of IRC v Duke of 
Westminster ... This is the cardinal principle but it must not be overstated or overextended. 
While obliging the court to accept documents or transactions, found to be genuine, as such, 
.. 
it does not compel the court to look at the document or transaction in blinkers isolated from 
93@25 
94@20 
95 [1982] AC 300 [HL] 
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any context to which it properly belongs. If it can be seen that a document or transaction 
was intended to have effect as part of a nexus or series of transactions, or as an ingredient 
of a wider transaction intended as whole, there is nothing in the doctrine to prevent it 
being so regarded : to do so in not to prefer form to substance, or substance to form. It is 
the task of the court to ascertain the legal nature of any transaction to which it is sought to 
attach a tax or a tax consequence and if that emerges from a series or combination of 
transactions, intended to operate as such, it is that series or combination which may be 
regarded." 
Lord Wilberforce96 in Ramsay's case finally destroyed the myth of Duke v Westminster saying : 
'It is true that the taxpayer must be taxed by reference to what he or she has actually done, 
not only by reference to what he or she might have done to achieve the same result. 
But in ascertaining what the taxpayer has done, it does not follow that a preordained series 
of transactions, planned and carried through as a whole, must be broken up into its several 
steps before applying the statute to each step separately. It is now clear that this approach is 
wrong. 
Where there is a single, preordained, composite transaction intended to be carried through 
as a whole, and no likelihood in practice exists that it will not, the court must consider the 
scheme as a whole and is not confined to a step by step examination ... To force the courts to 
adopt, in relation to closely integrated situations, a step by step, dissenting, approach which 
the parties themselves may have negated, would be a denial rather than an affirmation of 
the true judicial process ... viewed as whole, a composite transaction may produce an effect 
which brings it within a fiscal provision. [ my emphasis]" 
In Ramsay case, the court did not rely on the presence of tax avoidance motive, but on the 
absence of any purpose or effect other than the avoidance of tax. 
Lord Diplock in IRC v Burmah Oi197 noted that : 
96 Ramsay case supra 
97 [1982]STC 30 
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"it would be disingenuous to suggest, and dangerous on the part of those who advise on 
elaborate tax avoidance schemes to assume that Ramsay's case did not mark a significant 
change in the approach adopted by this House in its judicial role to a pre - ordained series 
of transactions (whether or not they include the achievement of a legitimate commercial 
end) into which there are inserted steps that have no commercial purpose apart from the 
avoidance of a liability to tax which in the absence of those particular steps would have 
been payable." 
Similarly, Lord Scarman in Furniss v Dawson98 correctly noted the importance of the judicial 
role in curbing tax avoidance schemes stating as follows : 
"[The] legal profession (and others) must understand that the law [concerning the 
Ramsay doctrine] is in an early stage of development... the law will develop from 
case to case. Lord Wilberforce in Ramsay referred to the "emerging principle" of 
the law. What has been established with certainty by the House in Ramsay is that 
the determination of what does, and does not, constitute unacceptable tax evasion 
is a subject suited to development by judicial process ... The limits within which 
[the Ramsay] principle is to operate remain to be probed and determined 
judicially. Difficult though the task may be for judges .. .it is one which is beyond 
the power of the blunt instrument of legislation of legislation. Whatever a statute 
may provide, it has to be interpreted and applied by the courts, and ultimately it 
will prove to be in this area of judge - made law our elusive journey's end will be 
found." 
In Furniss v Daw.son the doctrine over form approach was extended and the House of Lords held 
that even genuine transactions could be_disregardedjf they_fo@J&_Qart of a planned series of 
transactions and had been inserted without ~y commercial purpose. The House of Lords was 
concerned to set aside the transaction only on the basis that it made no commercial sense other 
than avoiding tax. It was therefore the absence of any commercial or financial purpose which 
98 supra 
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was fatal in this case. 
This stricter approach was tempered with by the House of Lords in Craven v Wbite99 where it 
was held that the motive of avoiding tax was not in itself a sufficient reason to disregard a 
transaction, but that the absence of any commercial or business purpose could indicate that a 
transaction was artificial. 
Taking Ramsay, Furniss and Burmah cases together, the English Law position can be 
summarised as follows : 
(a)The avoidance scheme is either a ready - made plan purchased for a fee 
(Ramsay), or a pre - conceived plan tailor - made for the taxpayer by his advisers 
(Lord Fraser in Burmah case) 
(b) There must be a 'pre - ordained series of transactions', or 'pre - planned tax 
saving scheme' or a 'single composite transaction' and there is no 'practical 
likelihood' that any subsequent transaction would not be implemented in the 
planned sequence. The test is whether the series of transactions are pre - ordained, 
not whether they are pre - contracted. ( Lord Brightman in Furniss case) 
( c) There must be steps in the series of transactions, scheme or operation which 
have no 'commercial or business purpose' apart from the purpose of avoiding, 
deferring or saving tax or obtaining a tax advantage. 
( d) The scheme comprises a number of steps to be carried out, documents to be 
executed and payments to be made in rapid succession according to a timetable. 
(e) The scheme involves the taxpayer being in the same position as he started with 
no real loss being made, except the fees and expenses paid in the implementation 
99 [1988] STC 476 
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of the scheme. 
9.2 SOUTH AFRICA: THE LADYSMITH CASE 
One might have thought that since in South Africa we have a general anti - tax avoidance section, 
unlike in the United Kingdom, that obviated the need for South African courts to invoke the 
common law 'substance over form' approach in the interpretation of the tax legislation. In a 
landmark decision of Ladysmith100 the court applied the substance over form approach to a series 
of pre ordained transactions which were devised and aimed at maximising a tax benefit for the 
group. The significance of the Ladysmith case is that the court did not invoke the provisions of· 
section 103(1) of the Income Tax Act but rather applied the principles of common law. 
Under section 103(1) the Commissioner would have had to first prove existence of all the 
requirements thereunder before the court could declare the scheme a tax avoidance scheme.At the 
same time the invokation of the 'substance over form' approach, instead of section 103(1), 
operates to the taxpayer's advantage since successful attack of his scheme under the substance 
over approach would not render him liable to section 89quat interest which would otherwise have 
been payable. 
The court in Ladysmith case was of the view that the substance of a transacticm prevails over 
mere nomenclature and that in determining the legal rights of the parties to the scheme will look 
to the real, true and genuine intention of the parties to the transaction, and will effect to what a 
transaction really is and not merely to what in form it purports to be. Before the court can invoke 
the substance over form approach it must be satisfied that there is a real intention, definitely 
ascertainable, which differs from the simulated intention.101 
In the case ofCCE v Randles Brothers and Hudson Ltd102_ Watermeyer JA said: 
"A transaction is not necessarily a disguised one because it is devised for the 
JOO supra 
JOI Zandberg v Van Zyl 1910 AD 302 
102 1941 AD 369, 33 SATC 48 @395 
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purpose of evading the prohibition in the Act or avoiding liability for tax imposed 
by it. A transaction devised for that purpose, if the parties honestly intend it to 
have effect according to its tenor, and then the only question is whether, so 
interpreted, it falls within or without the prohibition or tax." 
A disguised transaction in the sense in which the words are used above is 
something different. In essence it is a dishonest transaction : dishonest, in as much 
as the parties to it do not really intend it to have, inter partes, the legal effect 
which its terms convey to the outside world. The purpose of the disguise is to 
deceive by concealing what is the real agreement or transaction between the 
parties. The parties wish to hide the fact that their real agreement or transaction 
falls within the prohibition or is subject to the tax and so they dress it up in a 
guise which conveys the impression that it is outside of the prohibition or not 
subject to tax. Such a transaction is said to be in fraudem legis and is interpreted 
by the courts in accordance with what is found to be the real agreement or 
transaction between the parties. 
Of course, before the court can find that a transaction is in fraudem legis in the 
above sense, it must be satisfied that there is some unexpressed agreement or tacit 
understanding between the parties." 
The court found as question of fact that there was ample evidence to show that the consequences 
of the arrangement between the company and the manufacturer were fully intended and that 
ownership did in fact pass i.e both parties had intended the consequences of the agreement. 
The approach of the South African Appellate Division as manifested in Randle Brothers case is 
completely different from from the English substance over form approach which focuses on the 
purposive interpretation of the legislation to curb tax avoidance. Randle Brothers case is 
concerned with the actual agreement, such that if the actual agreement is set out accurately in 
the written contracts even the existence of a tax· avoidance does not allow these agreements to be 
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ignored. In Furniss v Dawson103 the court accepted that the transactions between the parties 
were completely genuine; the parties intended the transactions to have full effect in accordance 
with the tenor of the agreement. There was no suggestion of a 'tacit' or an 'unexpressed' 
agreement between the parties. 
The court instead adopted a purposive approach and held that even genuine transactions could be 
disregarded if they formed part of a planned series of transactions and had been inserted without 
any commercial purpose on the basis that it made no commercial sense other than avoiding tax. 
In Randle Brothers case, on the other hand, the Appellate Division was at pain to point that the 
court had to give effect to the true intention of the parties to an agreement and that if the parties 
genuinely arranged their affairs to avoid tax then the courts will not interfere. Only if the parties 
purported to enter into one transaction, whereas in reality and by tacit understanding they were 
entering into a completely different 
transaction, would the courts rend aside the veil of the disguised transaction. 
The decision in Randles Brothers case is still good law in this country and has never been 
tempered with. 
9.2.2 THE LADYSMITH JUDGMENT 
In Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd and another v CIR104 the facts were: In 1983 the directors of 
Pioneer Seed Company(Pty) Ltd ('Pioneer') and its subsidiary Pioneer Seed Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
('Holdings') decided to establish a furniture factory which 'Pioneer' would operate. Two plots 
were acquired appellants using a person acting as nominee. In 1984, inorder to achieve leasing of 
I 
the land and construction of the factory, eight separate but interrelated written agreements 
comprising two practically identical sets of four agreements were concluded between the 
taxpayers, the pension fund ( hereinafter referred to as the fund) and pioneer. One set of 
agreement related to the stand owned by the first appellant and the other to the stand owned by 




(a) A lease agreement in tenns of which the appellant leases its stand to the Board of Executors 
Pension Fund for the period 1 April 1984 to 31 July 1991. In tenns of the head lease the lessee 
shall be entitled at its expense to erect buildings and other improvements on the said stand as it 
detennined; and the buildings were to become property of the lessor, the lessee having no claim 
against the lessor for compensation. 
(b) A sublease agreement between pioneer and the fund in tenns of which the fund sublets the 
property to pioneer for the same period of 7 years as the initial lease. In addition the agreement 
provides that the buildings to be erected by the fund, to be occupied by pioneer, in accordance 
with plans approved by pioneer, and for which pioneer was required to pay a monthly rental and 
a premium, in consideration for the sublessor having agreed to erect the buildings on the land, on 
the date of completion of the building. 
( c )A building contract between the fund and a building contractor for the construction of a 
factory building on each piece of land. 
(d) Certain rent variation agreements: that the fund's liability to the taxpayers in respect of the 
rent due had to discharged from the rent accruing to it from the sublessee. 
The Commissioner assessed the taxpayers on the basis that the erection of the building on two 
stands brought about an accrual of income under paragraph (h) of the definition of the gross 
income which includes : 
"In the case of any person to whom, in terms of the agreement relating to the grant to any other person of 
the right to use or occupation of land or buildings, or by virtue of the cession of any rights under any such 
agreement, there has accrued in any such year or period the right to have improvements effected on the land 
or to the buildings by any other persons." 
The appellants contended that effect had to given to the set of agreements according to their tenor 
despite their underlying purpose relying on the principle expounded by Lord Tomlin in /RC v 
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Duke of Westminster105 that 'every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax 
attaching the appropriate Acts is less than It otherwise would be'. The court then had to decide 
whether the taxpayers had-succeeded in achieving that result. 
The appellant also contended that the amount relating to leasehold improvements(the buildings) 
did not fall into its gross income under paragraph (h) because paragraph (h) does not deal with 
the benefit accruing to the owner of the land as a result of the improvements of his property, but 
with the accrual of a right to have improvements effected. The appellants agreed that the main 
lease 'entitles ' but did not 'oblige' the fund to erect the buildings on the leased property and the 
fund was indeed obliged to erect the buildings but that obligation stemmed from the terms of the 
sub - leases. 
This obligation was, however, enforceable by pioneer and not by them i.e the appellants and 
therefore, in the absence of an obligation enforceable by them, a right to have the buildings 
erected did not accrue to them. 
On evidence the witness stated that the aim of the scheme was to procure the benefit of a 
deduction under section 1 l(f) of the Income Tax Act. The court rejected the appellant's claim 
that section 1 l(f) deduction was the aim of the scheme. Refer JA, who delivered the judgment of 
the court, correctly pointed out that had section ll(f) deduction been the main consideration, it 
would have been unnecessary to introduce a third party into the scheme. Refer JA was of the 
opinion that it was perfectly obvious that the appellant's tax liability had been their dominant 
'd . 106 \ 11 n __,u,,.,n,, _ . 1, cons1 eratlon. 1 0 · , -~ · · ;i,. ~ "' ll I 
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Refer correctly noted the following : 
105 
"Affiliated companies are of course at liberty to structure their mutual 
relationships in whatever legal way their directors may prefer; but when, for no 
apparent reason, a third party is interposed in that might equally well have been an 




The legislature put an end to this fancy arrangement by disallowing a deduction of lease 
premium, under section 1 l(f), or the cost of improvements under section 1 l(g) where the accrual 
under paragraph (g) or (h) of the definition of the gross income is to a person exempt from tax 
thereon because this was unfair to the Revenue to allow a deduction on amounts which are not 
taxable or are of capital nature in the hands of the recipient. 
On the facts, therefore, the court· was required to determine whether paragraph (h) of the 
definition of gross income applied. The Commissioner contended that the agreements did not 
reflect the real intention of the contracting parties because the entire purpose was to evade tax. 
He further contended that the agreements were concluded in a form which concealed the fact that 
the appellant did acquire the right to have the buildings erected and for this contention relied on 
the terms of the agreement considered in totality. 
The court considered that the issue before the court was whether the contracting parties actually 
intended that each agreement would have an effect inter partes according to its tenor. If not, 
Refer JA, pointed out that effect must be given to what the transaction really is and further said 
that: 5~,t.Ar) 
I must point out that, by virtue of the provisions of section 82 of the Act, the if 1h "' 
~ 
burden to prove that any amount is exempt from tax and the duty to show that the e,o~ 
Commissioner's decision to disallow their objection to the assessments was :~ ~-: 
s .J/4..,,,r 
wrong rests on the appellants. Therefore unless the appellants have shown on -f1.-,--'r 1 
\ '> °' preponderance of probability that the agreements do indeed reflect the actual 
~v\ 
intention of the parties thereto, the Commissioner's decision cannot be ~-
disturbed."107 
In order to ascertain whether the lessor had acquired the right to have improvements effected , 
examined the intention of the parties in the light of the facts of the case and in the light of the 
totality of circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the four agreements. This gave rise to a 
107 @953E 
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conclusion that there was a 'real likelihood that there was an unexpressed agreement or tacit 
understanding between the appellants and pioneer (the sub lessee) that the taxpayer would be 
entitled, if need be, to enforce compliance with the terms of the sublease, viz. the erection of the 
improvements by the lessee (the fund), either against the sub - lessee or against the lessee and the 
sub - lessee jointly'. 
In other words the court found that the real intention of the parties, given that all the agreements 
were interdependent on one another, despite the fact that the parties attempted to give the 
agreements a semblance of self - sufficiency which they did not in reality have, was that the 
appellants were just as much entitled to demand the erection of the factory as was the fund. On 
the basis of this conclusion the court found that the appellants had not discharged the onus 
resting on them of proving that a right under paragraph (h) of 'gross income' has not accrued to 
· them nor that there was no such unexpressed or tacit understanding. 
In ITC 1611 108 on the same facts as that in Ladysmith case, Wunsh J found it unnecessary to go 
as far as invoking the substance over form approach but instead relied on the intention of the 
parties to the contract. In so doing he rejected the English substance over form approach. To me 
the means used may be different but the end is the same i.e to suppress the mischief of tax 
avoidance. In finding that the taxpayer was taxable on the cost of improvements in terms of 
paragraph (h) of the gross income definition in similar circumstances to that of Ladysmith case, 
Wunsh J held that a court could examine whether there was a tacit term in the contract, that is the 
term to which the parties actually intended and agreed upon but did not reduce to writing. The 
enquiry was thus found to be 'whether on the basis of the proved facts and circumstances it was 
probable that a tacit agreement had been reached.' 
Accordingly the court's approach was based upon ascertaining the true intention of the parties to 
the contract. The court found that this is what Watemeyer JA meant when he said in Randle 
Brothers109 case that, 'before the court can find that a transaction is in fraudem legis ... it must 
be satisfied that there is some unexpressed agreement or tacit understanding between the parties.' 
108 
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In short therefore, Ladysmfth case marks a further important step in the development of the 
court's increasing critical ~~roach to the manipulation of commercial transactions to the 
advantage of the taxpayer. In a tax avoidance scheme, it is now not necessary for the steps 
involved to be carried out pursuanf te a binding contractual arrangement. It is sufficient ifthere is 
a non - binding contractual underst~ding, intention or real likelihood inferred from the totality 
of circumstances in the case, which differs from what the transaction purports to be. 7 
. ·. ~~ ~ ~ cl'o,.Je-' 
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lt may further be said that the Ladysmith case is an important judgment in the area of tax 
avoidance and sends a message that tax reduction is not an evil if not done evilly. The courts will 
not be deceived by taxpayer's use of fictitious devices and disguised transactions, but will look 
at the true intention of the parties. Ladysmith case at the same time strengthens the judicial role 
in combating tax avoidance without having to resort to statutory provisions of section 103 but by 
merely invoking the common law principles. It also makes the taxpayer and tax planners more 
aware than ever before that the transactions characterised by good tax planning must stand up to 
scrutiny and exposure 
not only by the Commissioner, but also with the judiciary which is responding to tax avoidance 
not only through the application of section 103(1) but also by means of highly effective 
principles of common law. 
Of relevance in this regard is decision in Johnson v Jewitt110 where a taxpayer attempted to 
create an artificial loss of huge sum of money by creating and juggling with 79 companies and so 
claimed a large tax rebate. The transaction was held to be a complete sham and the court went on 
to state that : 
"We were asked, what was this if it were not trading? .. .I would call it a cheap exercise of fiscal 
conjuring and book keeping phantasy, involving a gross abuse of the Companies Act and having 
as its unworthy object the extraction from the Exchequer of an emomous sum which the 
Appellant had never paid in tax and to which he has no shadow of a right whatsoever." 




Every taxpayer who wishes to avoid tax legally must be aware of what constitutes good tax 
planning. 
One of the best definitions of personal tax planning was given by Gavin Urquart at a seminar on 
"Personal Tax Planning" presented by 'Finance Week' and 'The Taxpayer' during September 
1987: 
"Person tax planning can properly be described as .. the management and arrangement of the 
affairs of an individual, so as to legally minimise as far as possible and as cost effective as 
possible, all taxes payable within the constraints imposed by the commercial and other objectives 
of that and associated taxpayers." 
This definition emphasises most of the important principles of a successful tax. planning which 
include the following : 
- tax planning must take cognisance of not only the Income Tax Act but also of all 
tax legislation administered by the Commissioner 1.e 
(a) Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955 
(b) Marketable Securities Tax Act 32 of 1948 
(c) Stamp Duty Act 77 of 1968 
( d) Transfer Duty Act 40 of 1949 
(e) Value Added Tax 89 of 1991 
- in the light of the 'business purpose test' in section 103(1), commercial and business 
purpose, not concerned with the incidence of tax, must be primary considerations so as to 
make the scheme commercially viable. 
- the tax plan must be cost effective. 
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- the transaction which constitutes a plan must be perfectly legitimate and legal. 
- the tax plan must relate not only to the individual concerned but also to financially 
associated taxpayers and family members. 
- in the light of the Ladysmith case, taxpayers must not only confine themselves, when tax -
planning, to the application of section 103 but must also take cognisance of the limitations 
imposed by common law, since fiscus is also protected by common law, on the right to arrange 
the affairs of a tax with the object of paying the minimum amount of tax that is legally required 
ofhim. 
A taxpayer must have. a thorough knowledge of all the tax legislation administered by the 
Commissioner so that he will not have to resort to tax evasion to save tax, and in so doing a 
taxpayer will be able to plan his affairs in such a way that his tax planning will coincide with the 
principles of tax legislation itself. It the taxpayer knows the basic principles of the tax legislation, 
he will also be able to arrange his affairs in such a way that he receives the smallest possible 
amount of taxable income and may simultaneously be able to deduct as many of his expenses. 
The taxpayer must also the important distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion and the 
legal consequences of such. Tax evasion is serious offence and attracts serious penalties under 
sections 75, 76 and 104 of the Income Tax Act. On the other hand, tax avoidance is legal an<!_ if 
the taxpayer's scheme falls foul of section 103(1) or (2), he will at worst be liable to section 
89quat interest. 
Harvey Dale 111 , an American lawyer stated that : 
" a loophole in tax which is too readily and obviously usable becomes not a loophole but a 
noose. It will be closed and the taxpayer may be unable to extricate himself." 
111 
P. Pencharz in "Tax Havens" 1979 De Rebus 265 @270 
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In other words, loopholes are allowed to remain provided that they are not over exploited. But 
once it is evident that a particular loophole is attracting too many avoiders, then it is the duty of 
the Revenue to close it. If a loophole exists, nothing prevents the taxpayer from using it and take 
advantage of it before it closed. 
CHAPTERll 
CONCLUSION 
The problems with tax avoidance will not disappear, and unless some alternative better approach 
is available, it may be that misdirected solutions are better than none at all. The fate of the 
'business purpose' test is yet to be seen. Although some may argue that it is a loophole which 
will make the tax avoidance provision ineffective, there is a difference between not trying and 
not winning. The Ladysmith case is not an end in itself but is an 'emerging principle' of law 
which will be developed by judges from case to case in an attempt to curb tax avoidance. 
Therefore the court is not only armed with the tax avoidance provisions as contained in tax\ 
legislation, but is also armed with common law principles in protecting fiscus. 
Tax payers can tailor their conduct in ways that increase the distortions in the system, decrease 
their share of tax liability, and produce results that are economically either meaningless, or at 
worst, undesirable. As long as many of the countries best lawyers and tax experts continue to be 
so well paid for finding and maximising the mismeasurements that lead to abuse, it is likely that 
tax experts and their clients will almost always at least remain ahead of the legislators and 
judiciary's attempts to curb tax avoidance. Nor does the fact that current approaches to tax 
avoidance may seem irrational, imply that tax avoidance in South Africa cannot be dealt with 
reasonably. It simply means that it has not been so dealt with yet, and that the struggle between 
the taxpayer and the Revenue will continue! and will not be laid to rest. 
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